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ABSTRACT 
 
The global supply of oil will closely match the demand for oil over the foreseeable 
future.  The critical role oil plays in national economies, combined with the tight global 
oil supply, means that oil security is a vital concern for every country, and in particular 
the United States.  The United States currently ranks as the largest oil consumer and oil 
importer, forcing them to rely on unstable sources of oil.  This has resulted in the 
United States becoming one of the least energy-secure nations in the world.  This thesis 
will evaluate Canada‟s capacity to improve American oil security to the year 2030.  
Canadian oil production will increase substantially in the next 20 years with most of the 
growth in output coming from the “oil sands”.  The majority of this future oil 
production will be exported to the United States and by 2030 Canadian oil imports will 
account for a large proportion of American total petroleum imports.  NAFTA 
provisions have de-politicized the North American energy trade; this guarantees 
American access to Canadian oil supplies and ensures that Canada can sell to the 
American market.  This liberal framework, therefore, increases American oil security 
despite a complete dependence on Canadian oil exports. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
b/d  Barrels per day 
CAFE  Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
CAPP  Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers  
CERA  Cambridge Energy Research Associates 
CSS  Cyclic Steam Stimulation 
EIA  Energy Information Administration 
ESIA  Energy and Security Independence Act 
EWG  Energy Watch Group 
FTA  Free Trade Agreement 
Gb  Billion barrels of oil 
GHG  Greenhouse Gases 
IEA  International Energy Agency 
In situ  Oil sands recovery technique, Latin phrase meaning “in place” 
Mb/d  Million barrels per day 
Mtoe  Million tons of oil equivalent 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement  
NEB  National Energy Board 
OCS  Outer Continental Shelf 
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OPEC  Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PADD  Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts 
SAGD  Steam Assisted Gravity Drainage 
WCSB Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
During the 18
th
 century a profound socioeconomic and cultural change began to 
take place that would irreversibly alter the course of human history.  In England a 
massive migration was underway as ever greater numbers of people began to leave their 
traditional homes in the countryside in order to gain employment in the growing 
manufacturing industry.  The Industrial Revolution not only changed where people 
lived and how they made their living, it changed humankinds‟ conception of how goods 
were to be produced; no longer would manufactured goods such as textiles be produced 
on a small scale by individuals.  The cottage industry, an informal decentralized 
network of small independent producers of manufactured goods, came to be replaced 
by large textile mills and factories which produced goods in vastly larger quantities 
than was previously thought possible.  None of this, however, would have been 
possible to achieve without the development of the steam engine.  Although the steam 
engine was originally designed to pump water out of the mines, the design evolved 
throughout the period and came to power an increasingly diverse array of machine tools 
and eventually was adapted to drive trains and steamboats.  In a time where wind and 
water had been the main sources of energy to power small machines, the development 
of the steam engine allowed factories to be built further away from rivers since the 
energy source could now be brought directly to the factory.  This new energy source 
was coal.  From this point onwards the secure supply of primary energy sources became 
an ever increasing concern not only for industry, but for government as well. 
The use of coal for energy production had a number of benefits which allowed it 
to remain the largest source of energy in the world until the mid-20
th
 century; it was 
cheap, abundant, and locally available.  Coal, however, is not without its drawbacks.  In 
addition to being difficult to transport, the negative environmental effects from burning 
coal are well documented.  Despite these drawbacks, coal had no substitute and its use 
grew unabated.   During the Second Industrial Revolution in the mid-19
th
 century, just 
as coal powered steam engines and steamboats were being produced, exploration for a 
new energy source was beginning across the ocean from the United Kingdom.  In the 
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small American town of Titusville, Pennsylvania a man known as Colonel Drake 
drilled the first successful oil well in 1858 [Yergin, 1991].  Similar to coal a century 
earlier, crude oil did not have many uses when it was first commercially produced.  
Distilled into kerosene, the primary application for oil was as a fuel for lamps.  The 
lamp oil market was very profitable and spawned the creation of some of the first large 
international corporations such as John D. Rockefeller‟s Standard Oil of New Jersey, 
known today as ExxonMobil.  The market for oil was just in its infancy and with the 
advent of the internal combustion engine oil was poised to become the dominant global 
energy source.  In 1916 there were approximately 3.4 million cars registered in the 
United States, a number that would jump to 23.1 million by the end of the 1920s 
[Yergin, 1991] and currently stands at close to 250 million [Plunkett Research].  This 
booming number of vehicles resulted in American oil production rising sharply to meet 
the increased demand for petroleum products.  American oil production increased from 
574,000 b/d in 1910, to 1.2 Mb/d in 1920, 4.1 Mb/d in 1940 before peaking at 9.6 Mb/d 
in 1970 [EIA Petroleum Navigator].  Oil consumption and the demand for motor fuels 
continued to grow worldwide but the vital importance of oil was truly demonstrated 
during the rebuilding effort in Europe after the Second World War.  Already faced with 
a shortage of food and raw materials, European countries were confronted with the 
additional problem of a coal shortage in 1946.  The coal shortage forced the closure of a 
number of power stations across England and industrial production was suspended for 
three weeks [Yergin, 1991].  To help with the rebuilding of Europe, the United States 
conceived the aid program known as the Marshall Plan.   Armed with billions of 
American dollars in aid, the European nations solved the problem of inadequate coal 
supplies by buying larger amounts of crude oil.  In addition to fueling cars, planes and 
ships, power stations, home furnaces and industrial boilers were converted to also burn 
oil.  The importance of this shift to oil cannot be overstated, according to a U.S. 
government report “without petroleum the Marshall Plan could not have functioned 
[Yergin, 1991]. 
Compared to coal, oil has the benefit of being easier to transport and is 
environmentally cleaner to consume.  It was also possible to substitute oil in many of 
the areas where coal had traditionally been the sole primary energy source.  As a result 
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oil consumption rose quickly and by 1950 oil had replaced coal as the main source of 
America‟s energy needs, and it continues to be so today.  There was, however, one 
major drawback to oil; domestic production in America was not sufficient to meet 
demand.  Up until the mid-1940s American net crude oil imports were negligible but as 
consumption increased so did the need for imports.  Net imports of crude oil increased 
from 113,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 1945 and reached 1 Mb/d in 1960 before climbing 
to over 10 Mb/d in the late 2000s [EIA Petroleum Navigator].  With oil playing an 
increasingly important role in the American and global economy a new concern quickly 
emerged; oil security.  In general oil security refers to the stability and reliability of oil 
supplies.  The potential threats, however, differ for oil producing and oil consuming 
nations.  Oil producing nations must ensure not only that their oil facilities can reliably 
produce oil but that the oil can also be brought to market, either domestically or 
internationally.  The most important factors when assessing the oil security of a 
producing nation is the domestic political situation, the ability to safely transport oil, 
and production and refining capacities.  There are several issues in particular for which 
oil producing nations must prepare; oil facilities and pipelines face threats from 
potential terrorist attacks in addition to damage from severe weather events such as 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005.  Oil production and oil exports are sometimes affected by 
government interference, as is evident in Venezuela.  During Hugo Chavez‟s 
presidency the Venezuelan oil industry has been nationalized and the state oil company, 
PDVSA, subsequently had its role expanded to include the funding of social programs.  
PDVSA is required to spend at least ten percent of its investment budget on social 
projects, such as building free medical centers and selling discounted food [Alvarez, 
2009].  This requirement has shifted focus and investments away from the company‟s 
core competency, oil production.  As a result Venezuela‟s oil production has decreased 
23% between 2000 and 2008 [EIA International Energy Statistics], despite having some 
of the world‟s largest oil reserves. 
For oil consuming countries oil security refers to the level of security regarding 
its consumption pattern.  Total production and refining levels are again important 
factors, in addition to the level of net oil imports and the source countries of imports.  
The greatest dangers for oil consuming countries have to do with transportation and 
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geopolitics.  Oil shipments en route to their final destination have come under greater 
threat recently as oil tankers have been targeted by pirates in the Gulf of Eden and 
pipelines have been threatened by terrorist bombings in many regions of the world.  
Furthermore, unlike other commodities or traded goods, the purchasing of oil from 
foreign nations is more than a simple market transaction.  Politics are often intertwined 
with the oil industry and, as such, importing countries face the risk of being targets of 
the “oil weapon”; the intentional withholding of oil supplies.  The realization that oil 
and energy supplies are critically important economic factors has led several producing 
countries to use their energy resources as tools of power in a realist framework.  
Chapter 1 describes the manners in which Middle Eastern and North African countries 
have attempted to use the oil weapon in an attempt to influence international positions 
vis-à-vis Israel and the long-term response of Western countries to the embargo.  Russia 
is yet another country that has been using energy power to maintain influence in world 
affairs through supply disruptions.  In both cases it will be shown that the realist 
approach has actually harmed the actor by creating distrust among the countries 
affected by the supply interruptions.  Instead of building closer relationships to avoid 
future supply interruptions, affected countries will seek other sources of energy 
supplies, try to limit the growth of energy consumption, and seek other methods to limit 
the leverage of the producing countries.  Contrary to the negative consequences from 
the realist strategy, the neoliberal American-Canadian approach to energy trade has 
fostered greater trust and cooperation between the two countries.  With Canada poised 
to increase oil production over the coming decades the United States will seek to 
increase their import dependence on Canada knowing that supply agreements are 
protected by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  The United States 
is currently one of the least energy-secure nations in the world, however, increasing 
dependence on Canada will improve their oil supply security. 
Before beginning an examination of the oil security of Canada and the United 
States it is important to undertake a detailed outlook of the global oil industry as we 
move towards the year 2030.  Whether the world will face an oil glut similar to the 
situation in the 1950s and 1960s, or an oil shortage will undoubtedly have an impact on 
all nations, Canada and the United States included.  In the case of a global surplus in oil 
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supplies, oil security of individual nations would be improved because oil producing 
nations would aggressively seeking markets in which to sell their oil.  Conversely, in 
the event of a global oil shortage the oil security of consuming nations would be 
negatively impacted as nations compete against one another in an attempt to secure oil 
supplies.  The coercive power from the threat or imposition of an oil embargo upon oil 
consuming nations is also much greater in the event of an oil supply shortage due to the 
fact that it is nearly impossible to substitute oil with another energy source in the short-
term.  As a non-renewable natural resource it is clear that oil reserves have a limited 
lifespan and several authors argue that the world has already passed the point of peak 
oil production.  However many reputable organizations, among them the International 
Energy Agency (IEA), Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) and the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) agree that remaining oil 
reserves are more than able to support continued growth in oil production so long as the 
necessary investments are made in upstream and downstream facilities.  Chapter 2 will 
critically analyze the literature concerning peak oil theory before determining the 
probable level of oil consumption to the year 2030.  It appears most likely that an oil 
crisis is not yet at hand, nevertheless global spare capacity will remain close to zero and 
supply will closely match demand without much margin for manoeuvring.  Growth in 
oil demand from China, India and other developing nations will increase more than in 
the industrial countries and will intensify the competition for oil supplies.   
Global oil production is but one factor determining the oil security of Canada 
and the United States, what must also be determined is the future of each country‟s 
domestic oil industry.  As the birthplace of the commercial oil industry, the United 
States has historically been one of the largest oil producers in the world.  Since 1970 
the United States has faced the unenviable problem of a simultaneous decline in oil 
production and an increase in oil consumption, leading the country to assume the 
position as the world‟s largest importer of oil by a wide margin.  American oil imports 
have risen from 6.26 Mb/d in 1973 to a staggering 12.91 Mb/d in 2008, more than the 
total consumption of the world‟s second largest consumer, China [EIA Petroleum 
Navigator].  With oil imports making up two-thirds of total oil consumption, the United 
States is forced to rely on a number of nations to satisfy its oil demand.  Relying on 
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unstable nations such as Venezuela, Nigeria, and Iraq for vital oil supplies, in addition 
to the overall level of imports, has led the Energy Security News to rank the United 
States as the least secure nation in term of oil supply security [DeBard, 2009].  There is 
some hope on the horizon to improve their precarious situation however.  Domestic oil 
production, in decline since 1970, could receive a boost if offshore oil production is 
allowed to begin following the removal of offshore drilling bans in 2008.  Oil 
consumption will also halt its historical rise due to the Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007, legislation which promotes greater energy efficiency and the use 
of biofuels and renewable energy.   Furthermore, the United States will be able to 
import greater volumes of oil from Canada enabling the U.S. to cut its level of 
dependence on OPEC countries and other nations with whom they have contentious 
relationships.  These issues will be expanded on in Chapter 3 and will demonstrate that 
the United States will see its oil supply security improve by 2030. 
Canada has been endowed with massive reserves of oil and will significantly 
increase its oil production over the next 20 years.  As such a more detailed look at the 
Canadian oil industry is essential.  Chapter 4 describes the composition of the Canadian 
oil reserves which are quite unique with both conventional and unconventional sources 
of oil.  The quiet oil giant, Canadian oil reserves are second in size only to Saudi 
Arabia.  Unlike the sweet light crude oil found on the Arabian Peninsula, however, 
almost the entirety of Canadian oil reserves is trapped in a thick mixture of oil, sand 
and water.   These “oil sands” are located in the Western Canadian province of Alberta 
and pose a number of challenges.  Extracting and refining the oil is much more 
complicated, expensive and energy intensive compared to conventional crude oil and 
emits greater levels of greenhouse gases.  These are important factors to consider as the 
issue of climate change continues to become a larger socio-political issue.  In order for 
Canada to become one of the largest oil producers the oil industry will need to improve 
technology so that extraction from the oil sands can become more efficient and less 
polluting.  As oil production increases it is likely that Canadian oil exports to the 
United States will also increase.  This mutually beneficial arrangement will improve 
American oil security while providing Canada with a large source of stable income. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE OIL 
WEAPON 
 
“There is no substitute for energy…The whole edifice of modern life is built upon it.  
Although energy can be bought and sold like any other commodity, it is not „just 
another commodity‟, but the precondition of all commodities, a basic factor equally 
with air, water and earth.” E.F. Schumacher1 [Yergin, 1991] 
 E.F. Schumacher‟s quote deliberately avoids naming a specific source of energy 
since the predominant primary source of energy changes over time.  From the 
beginning of the Industrial Revolution until the mid-20
th
 century the world‟s main 
source of primary energy came from coal.  The importance of coal diminished after oil 
production spread to the Middle East and North Africa in the mid-20
th
 century.  New oil 
producers such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, and Algeria were eager to reap the 
financial benefits that came from selling ever greater amounts of crude oil.  The 
combined actions of the new oil producers resulted in an over-supply which drove 
down the price of oil and made it cheaper than coal.  The low cost of crude oil, in 
addition to the wide array of petroleum products, helped to quickly establish oil as the 
new dominant source of energy.  Although oil will itself be replaced in importance by 
another source of energy in the future, it remains the most critical source of energy 
today.  In 2007 oil accounted for 42.6% of total global consumption of energy while 
coal and peat made up just 8.8% of consumption [IEA Key World Stats, 2009].  Oil 
accounts for an even larger share among industrialized nations; 49.7% of total energy 
consumption in OECD countries came from oil in 2007 [IEA Key World Stats, 2009].  
True to Schumacher‟s statement, unlike any other commodity, fluctuations in the price 
of oil can drive economic growth or just as easily start a recession.  The implications of 
this fact differ for individual countries depending whether they are oil producers or oil 
importers.  For many oil producing countries, particularly among developing nations, 
oil brings “power, influence, significance, and status” [Yergin, 1991] in addition to 
large revenues.  For developing nations, whose opinions are often disregarded in 
                                                          
1
 E.F. Schumacher: Chief Economic Advisor to the United Kindgom National Coal Board 1950-1970 
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international affairs, oil exports provide a significant source of leverage in order to gain 
a larger voice in the international community.  Several nations, however, have exploited 
their leverage on the international political scene.  Countries belonging to the 
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) have used the oil 
weapon several times, most notably in 1973, while Russia has also mixed politics and 
energy supplies a number of times since the year 2000.  The “oil weapon” refers to the 
deliberate withholding of oil supplies by the producing countries.  This economic 
weapon can be applied in a number of ways, either through a selective embargo against 
one or more countries or through a cut in overall production levels to create a global 
shortage of oil.  Using energy exports in this manner is an example of a realist 
framework in international relations.  The realist school is characterized by a belief that 
the international system is in a state of anarchy due to the absence of an international 
government [Burchill et al, 2005].  In an anarchic environment individual states cannot 
rely upon other nations for security and therefore “seek to survive under anarchy by 
maximizing their power relative to other states” [Mearsheimer, 1990].  In this zero-sum 
game of international politics Mearsheimer believes that states “seek opportunities to 
weaken potential adversaries and improve their relative power position” [1990].  The 
critical importance of energy supplies for national economies has been recognized by 
OAPEC members and Russia who have therefore chosen to increase their relative 
power positions through their energy exports.  OAPEC‟s goal in instituting the 1973 oil 
embargo was to force a return of land seized by Israel during the 1967 war, to grant 
rights to Palestinians and to change the status of Jerusalem [Licklider, 1988].  Russia, 
meanwhile, has attempted to use the power from energy exports for a number of 
reasons; as a demonstration of their displeasure over the eastern spread of NATO, to 
undermine political leaders in neighboring countries and to maintain their sphere of 
influence.  The effectiveness of this realist strategy is debatable.  Oil importing nations 
have not always acquiesced to the demands of the energy exporters.  They have instead 
attempted to maximize their oil security by securing reliable supplies from alternative 
sources [Yenikeyeff, 2009 and Kramer, 2009] and establishing energy sharing 
agreements to counteract the threat of an oil embargo.  One such agreement was the 
International Energy Program of 1974 which led to the creation of the International 
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Energy Agency (IEA).  Although the realist strategy is meant to improve the well-being 
of a country, it appears as though the long-term prospects for energy exporting 
countries are harmed by espousing the realist framework. 
In North America, where the United States is becoming increasingly dependent 
upon Canada as their largest oil supplier, the energy trade follows a different paradigm.  
Contrary to the consequences of the realist use of energy power demonstrated by 
certain Arab countries and Russia, the neo-liberal framework in North America creates 
greater trust and encourages the United States to increase their reliance on Canada.  In 
general, liberalism promotes market capitalism as the best method to increase the 
welfare of society [Burchill et al, 2005].  Of particular importance to neo-liberals is the 
role of free trade between nations.  Removing artificial barriers to trade, such as tariffs 
and quotas, will lower the costs of trade thereby increasing the overall level of trade 
between partners.  This in turn reduces tensions between partners by expanding the 
range of contacts and levels of understanding [Burchill et al, 2005].  Greater economic 
collaboration between countries, through free trade and the removal of other barriers to 
commerce, creates an interdependence which encourages non-military solutions to 
problems since each country has a “joint stake in each other‟s peace and prosperity” 
[Burchill et al, 2005]    The European Union is frequently cited as an example of the 
neoliberal framework, however interdependence between Canada and the United States 
has increased through their own free trade agreements.  Complete removal of tariffs and 
quotas began with the 1989 signing of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and continued 
under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which also included 
Mexico.  NAFTA has not only deepened the level of economic integration between 
Canada and the United States but has also regulated the energy trade.  As a 
consequence of these agreements Canadian oil exports have grown tremendously and 
Canada is now the largest foreign supplier of oil to the U.S. Furthermore, NAFTA 
ensures that the United States will continue to have access to Canadian oil production 
in the future.  The United States will therefore look for Canadian oil exports to make up 
a greater share of their total oil imports.  Contrary to the experience between Europe 
and Russia, greater American dependency on Canadian oil imports will actually 
increase American oil security.  Canadian oil imports will displace imports from other 
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regions of the world which are politically and economically volatile and from countries 
which may not have an interest in American oil security.  The benefits from NAFTA 
are far from one-sided as Canada will be able to reap the economic windfall from 
selling greater volumes of oil to the United States.  This mutually favourable 
arrangement is far more secure than the unreliable realist framework present in other 
energy exporting countries. 
1.1 The 1956 and 1967 Oil Embargos 
Forty years ago the United States was the largest producer of oil in the world, 
responsible for producing half of the world‟s crude oil.  American production, refining 
and transportation infrastructure was so advanced that the country enjoyed the luxury of 
having some spare capacity.  In the event of emergency American oil production could 
be increased to make up for losses in production from other regions, leading the 
National Security Council to state in 1960 that America was “Europe‟s principle safety 
factor in the event of denial of Middle East oil” [Yergin, 1991].  American and 
Venezuelan shut-in production was deemed sufficient enough to overcome any 
potential loss, and for a while this was true.  The oil weapon was first used during the 
Suez Crisis in 1956 and then in the Six-Day War of 1967 to little effect as global oil 
shipments were redirected to embargoed countries to minimize the effects of the supply 
interruption from the Middle East. 
In 1956 British, French and Israeli forces mounted an attack on Egypt in 
response to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser‟s decision to nationalize the Suez 
Canal.  The main objective of the military operation for the European nations was to 
regain control of the Suez Canal which was a vital transportation route of oil bound for 
Europe.  Originally constructed to shorten the shipping route from Britain to India, the 
Suez Canal played a much more important role in 1955; two-thirds of Europe‟s oil 
passed through the canal [Yergin, 1991].  The strategic importance of the Canal was not 
lost on Nasser who firmly advocated using the oil weapon.  He understood oil meant 
power because without oil “all the machines and tools of the industrial world are „mere 
pieces of iron, rusty, motionless, and lifeless‟” [Yergin, 1991].  Israeli forces 
concentrated on seizing the Sinai Peninsula while the French and English forced 
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advanced to secure the Canal.  Nasser managed to sabotage the canal before the Anglo-
French forces were able to secure it by sinking heavy ships at the entrance, effectively 
blocking it off.  Saudi Arabia further strained Europe‟s oil supply by deciding to stop 
all of their oil exports to France and Britain in retaliation for attacking Egypt.  The 
United States, upset at the attack by their allies, did not initially offer to help ease the 
oil shortage.  By December of 1956, however, it was starting to become clear that 
Europe was in great need of oil supplies and the United States decided the only course 
of action was to implement the “Oil Lift”.  The oil lift required increasing production 
by utilizing American shut-in capacity in addition to redirecting supplies headed for the 
U.S. towards Europe.  The oil embargo resulted in a total loss of 2 Mb/d [IEA Oil 
Supply Security, 2007] however the oil lift achieved its goal by covering almost 90% of 
the lost Middle Eastern supplies [Yergin, 1991].  By the spring of 1957 the Suez Crisis 
had ended with Egypt once again losing control of the Suez Canal.  The Suez Crisis 
demonstrated that the United States had the capability to subvert attempts by Saudi 
Arabia at restricting oil supplies; however this was in 1956 when oil only made up 20% 
of European energy needs [Yergin, 1991].  The industrialized nations were not yet 
dependent enough on Arab oil imports for Saudi and Egyptian actions to influence 
them.  A more concerted effort by oil producing nations and a higher volume of world 
oil exports would be needed if the oil weapon were to be effective.     
Following the Suez Crisis, the Sinai Peninsula and the Suez Canal were placed 
under U.N. peacekeeping control.  Western countries were relieved to have the canal 
open once again, however the events of 1956 created greater distrust of Israel and 
Western nations among the Arab countries.  The presence of the U.N. Emergency Force 
in the Sinai proved to be a temporary solution; in May 1967 Nasser ordered the 
withdrawal of all U.N. troops from Egypt, blocked all shipping to Israel through the 
Gulf of Aqaba and positioned Egyptian troops along Israel‟s border [Yergin, 1991].  
With armed forces in Egypt, Syria and Jordan positioning for an apparent attack, Israel 
decided to act pre-emptively with air strikes on Egyptian targets on June 5
th
, 1967.  The 
air strikes were impressively successful, so much so that the Arab nations were 
convinced Israel had direct support from Western nations in the assault.  Israel, 
however, acted alone.  In the years leading up to the Six Day War Israel had been 
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training their air force to gain air superiority in the region and their training had been so 
effective that it “made possible an attack greatly exceeding in intensity what Hussein 
and Nasser believed possible with the number of aircraft known to be in Israel‟s 
inventory” [Daoudi, 1984]. In a meeting of Arab nations in Baghdad on the first day of 
air strikes it was agreed that Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, 
Libya and Algeria would place under embargo any country that was helping Israel.  As 
a result the United States and Great Britain, assumed to have aided Israel in the air 
raids, and West Germany were denied Arab oil supplies [Daoudi, 1984]. 
Like the oil embargo in 1956, the 1967 embargo was largely ineffective.  The 
Arab countries had held a number of summits to discuss the actions to be taken and the 
opinions were severely divided.  The oil embargo had been proposed by non oil 
producing nations Egypt, Syria and Lebanon while the oil producing countries such as 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were not eager participants.  Calls by Iraq proposing a full 
stop to oil production were met with reservations, after all, income from oil production 
accounted for 97% of Kuwaiti government revenues and 87% of Saudi revenues 
[Daoudi, 1984].  In spite of disagreements the flow of oil was severely disrupted in the 
first several days of the war.  By the 8
th
 of June, 1967 the flow of Arab oil had been 
reduced by 60% with an initial loss of 6 Mb/d [Yergin, 1991].  Oil supplies were not 
only limited as a result of production stoppages but also due to the closing of refineries, 
pipelines, and the Suez Canal.  The embargo remained in place until the 4
th
 Arab 
Summit Conference in Khartoum, Sudan on August 29
th
, 1967 where it was agreed to 
end the embargo in exchange for Saudi, Kuwaiti and Libyan financial aid to Egypt to 
make-up for Egyptian financial losses from the war.  The net result of the embargo was 
a total halt of oil production in the Arab states for 5 days and a denial of supplies to the 
U.S., Great Britain and West Germany until September 2, 1967 [Daoudi, 1984].  The 
embargo caused a logistical nightmare for Europe.  Oil supplies had to be diverted 
away from the Suez and travel around the African continent, but it did not significantly 
reduce the amount of available oil to the importing countries.  The failure of the 
embargo was a result of several factors but most importantly due to the diversity of 
supply.  Some estimates show the total loss of oil was approximately 2 Mb/d over the 
course of the embargo [IEA Oil Supply Security, 2007], an amount easily made up 
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from the non-Arab producers.  OPEC members Venezuela and Iran did not act with 
their Arab counterparts, instead choosing to increase their oil production and gain a 
larger share of the world market.  The United States also increased domestic oil 
production so that the overall loss from the Arab countries was not significant.  For the 
embargo to have been more effective the Saudis, Kuwaitis and Libyans would have had 
to cut their total production output to create a larger loss of global oil supply.  Even a 
bold action such cutting production would ultimately be self-defeating, however, since 
there was still a global spare capacity of production.  Production cuts would have 
greatly complicated the world oil market but increased output from the non-Arab 
producers, in addition to the large stockpiles of oil in Western countries, would have 
mitigated much of the potential damage.  The Arab countries thus risked losing 
revenues and long-term export market contracts without having anything to show for it.  
For the embargo to work the Arab countries would have to control a greater amount of 
world oil production and keep the embargo in place for a longer amount of time.  The 
1967 embargo did demonstrate, however, that Arab nations were able to work in 
concert during a time of crisis.  The embargo was agreed to shortly after Israeli 
bombing began and throughout the ordeal the Arab countries did not break ranks.  For 
the oil producing countries, the power of the oil weapon to gain leverage in 
international affairs, particularly if it were to be applied on a larger scale, was now even 
more apparent.  The experience from 1967 revealed obstacles needed to be overcome in 
order to successfully use the oil weapon, lessons they applied during the 1973 Yom 
Kippur War. 
1.2 The 1973 Oil Embargo 
In the years following the Six-Day War conditions changed in favour of the 
Arab oil producing countries.  World oil consumption continued to increase in spite of 
the 1967 embargo with Middle Eastern countries responsible for most of the growth in 
oil output.  Particularly notable was the increase in American oil consumption leading 
up to the 1973 crisis.  To satiate demand American production was brought to 
maximum capacity, by 1970 the spare production capacity had dropped to 1 Mb/d from 
4 Mb/d in the late 1960s [Yergin, 1991].  In hindsight we now know that 1970 was 
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when American production peaked at a rate of 9.6 Mb/d [EIA Petroleum Navigator], 
forcing the government to ease oil import quotas.  With its production having peaked, 
the United States would need to rely on imported oil to supply any growth in 
consumption.  Between 1968 and 1973 American crude oil imports increased more than 
doubled from 1.2 Mb/d to 3.2 Mb/d [Figure 1, EIA Petroleum Navigator] and imports 
as a percentage of consumption from rose from 19% to 36% [Yergin, 1991].  The 
United States was now dependent upon oil imports and vulnerable to fluctuations in the 
global oil supply market.  No longer could American oil production be considered a 
safety net for Europe.   
Figure 1: U.S. Production and Imports of Crude Oil 1968-1973 (thousand barrels per day) 
 
Source: EIA Petroleum Navigator 
 
 Growing world oil consumption was a boon for Saudi Arabia.  With the largest 
proven reserves of any country it was an eventuality that Saudi Arabia would become 
the largest, and therefore most influential, oil producing country.  Saudi Arabian oil 
production increased dramatically, from 1.31 Mb/d in 1960 to 3.8 Mb/d in 1970 to 8.4 
Mb/d in 1973 [EIA World Crude Oil Production].  Saudi Arabia produced 13.6 % of 
the global oil supply in 1973 while the combined production from OPEC accounted for 
55.3% [EIA World Crude Oil Production].  The ability of Saudi Arabia and the other 
Arab oil producing countries to influence the world oil market was now without 
question, but the idea to use the oil weapon in 1973 did not originate in the Saudi 
Kingdom.  Continued Israeli occupation of land seized during the Six-Day War 
continued to be a highly contentious problem among many of the Arab countries, and 
with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in particular.  Sadat succeeded Nasser as 
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President of Egypt in 1970 and quickly realized that Israeli occupation of the Sinai 
Peninsula was the ideal issue around which he could gain support domestically, and 
among other Arab countries, in order to solidify his control over power.  Persistent 
conflict with Israel had not achieved any real gains for Egypt and resulted in the 
country spending far too much on the military, approximately 20% of GNP [Yergin, 
1991].  Sadat believed that in order to end the conflict with Israel he would to achieve 
more than military and territorial gains; he would also need Western countries to end 
their tacit support of Israel and increase Western dialogue with Arab countries.  To do 
this he would need Saudi Arabia and the other Arab oil producers to agree to an oil 
embargo, the one piece of leverage the Arab countries had. 
 Initially King Faisal was reluctant to support Sadat‟s plans.  Oil exports were 
rising and the Kingdom was making more money than it had ever thought possible.  
Experience from the 1967 embargo had shown that an embargo could lead to lost 
revenue with few concessions being won.  Additionally, Saudi Arabia had good 
relations with the United States and depended upon them for military support.  There 
was very little for Saudi Arabia to gain in terms of international relations from an 
embargo and they risked antagonizing the United States.  King Faisal, however, was 
faced with domestic threats to his reign in the 1970s which the United States could not 
resolve.  The Arab world was going through a volatile period where leadership was 
being openly challenged and deposed by nationalist and socialist movements.  On the 
25
th
 of May, 1969 a bloodless coup led by Colonel Gaafar al-Nimeiry took power from 
the civilian government of Sudan and installed a socialist system [Hevesi, 2009 and 
U.S. Department of State: Sudan].  Northeast of Sudan, Libya was also about to 
experience a change of power.  Since gaining independence from Italian colonial 
control on December 24, 1951 Libya had been a constitutional and hereditary monarchy 
under the rule of King Idris U.S. Department of State: Libya].  The discovery of large 
oil reserves in 1959 instantly made Libya a much wealthier country, however wealth 
was highly concentrated among the elite.  The uneven distribution of income along with 
the rise of socialist ideology created a highly unstable situation for the ruling elite, and 
on the 1
st
 of September 1969 King Idris was overthrown by 28 year old army colonel 
Muammar al-Qadhafi [U.S. Department of State: Libya].   Qadhafi sent King Idris to 
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Egypt in exile and in place of the monarchy Qadhafi installed the Revolutionary 
Command Council (RCC) whose motto was “freedom, socialism, and unity” [U.S. 
Department of State: Libya].  Events on the Arabian Peninsula, where fighting in 
Yemen resulted in the forming of a Marxist republic in 1970, brought the threat of coup 
in Saudi Arabia even closer.  Agreeing to Sadat‟s plans would enable King Faisal to 
pacify radical elements within his borders, minimizing terror threats to oil installations 
and pipelines and preserve the monarchy [Yergin, 1991]. 
 On October 6
th
, 1973 much of the world was caught off guard as Egypt and 
Syria began their attack on Israel just as the country was beginning the celebration of 
Yom Kippur.  King Faisal had warned the United States about repercussions from their 
military and ideological support of Israel however the war had still caught the 
Americans by surprise [Licklider, 1988].  Once the war began, meetings between the 
Arab countries were a daily occurrence with the oil weapon as the main topic of 
discussion.   Finally, on October 17
th
, 1973 the oil ministers had agreed to the 
framework of the oil embargo.  Production would be cut immediately by 5% with an 
additional cut of 5% every month thereafter until the objectives of the Arab countries 
were met [Yergin, 1991].  The oil exporters also decided to separate countries into three 
categories; friendly, neutral and hostile.  Friendly countries would not be subjected to 
any restrictions on imports while neutral countries were subject to the general monthly 
production cuts.  The United States and the Netherlands (later joined by Portugal, South 
Africa and the former Rhodesia) were classified as hostile states resulting in a complete 
ban on all Arab oil imports [Yergin, 1991].  The lessons from 1967 had been applied 
this time around, not only had certain countries been targeted with import restrictions 
but the production cuts meant the total supply of world oil was much lower.  With the 
global supply of oil closely matching demand, allied nations were no longer able to re-
shuffle oil shuffle supplies amongst themselves because the world was facing an actual 
shortage of supply.  The production cuts had a significant secondary benefit by raising 
the price of oil.  Loss of income had made the 1967 embargo less palatable for Saudi 
Arabia and the other Arab countries but the embargo as it was applied in 1973 had the 
effect of raising the price of oil fourfold in a very short span of time [Licklider, 1988].  
Oil exporting countries were now making more money from selling less oil.  Another 
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important difference from the 1967 embargo is that the Arab governments were now 
seeking political concessions from the Western world, namely; for Israel to return land 
occupied since the 1967 war, to recognize the rights of Palestinians, and to change the 
status of Jerusalem [Licklider, 1988].  The oil embargo thrust the Arab nations onto the 
international political scene.  By withholding oil supplies the Western world was forced 
to listen to the Arab leaders, and possibly even capitulate to their demands. Never 
before had the industrialized world been held hostage by developing nations, a fact 
surely enjoyed by the leaders of the Arab oil producing countries. 
 The embargo outlasted the actual fighting on the ground as war between Israel 
and Egypt came to an end on October 26
th, 1973.  Sadat‟s objectives for war had been 
achieved as talks between Egypt and Israel, in addition to talks with the United States, 
took place for the first time in many years.  Ending the oil embargo would take more 
time however, and two months after the imposition of the oil embargo some 4.3 Mb/d 
had been lost [IEA Oil Supply Security 2007], an amount equal to 14% of 
internationally traded oil [Yergin, 1991].  International oil companies were trying their 
best to deal with the embargo by diverting non-Arab sources of oil to embargoed 
countries in an effort to redistribute oil in the most equitable manner.  The efforts of the 
oil companies resulted in a fairly even shortage of oil in the industrialized world; the 
total loss of oil to the United States, Western Europe and Japan over the period of the 
embargo came out to 18%, 16% and 17% respectively [Yergin, 1991].  The oil embargo 
remained in place until March 1974 when Sadat recommended its end, believing the 
objectives of the embargo had been met.  Whether or not significant concessions were 
made to the Arab countries is open for debate. 
 The countries most likely to change their foreign policies in response to the oil 
embargo would have been the ones most dependent upon the Middle East for their oil 
imports.  European nations were among the countries which leaned heavily on the Arab 
countries for their oil imports, in the words of French President Georges Pompidou; 
“We are entirely dependent upon them” [Yergin, 1991].  By mid-November many 
European countries, including France and Great Britain, began to distance themselves 
from the United States by publicly stating opposition to America‟s Middle Eastern 
foreign policy and claiming to want an increase in dialogue and cooperation with Arab 
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countries.  Another country which desperately wanted to avoid a long-term loss of Arab 
oil was Japan, which similarly issued a pro-Arab statement shortly after the European 
countries.  These countries issued their statements in November and were rewarded for 
their compliance of Arab requests by being spared from further cutbacks [Yergin,1991].  
The impact of these concessions on changing foreign policy, however, was modest at 
best.  Most of the statements were simply rhetoric and it is not evident that concrete 
foreign policy changes occurred as a result of the oil embargo.  Great Britain, for 
example, had been involved in the drafting of UN Resolution 242 which demanded the 
return of all land occupied by Israel during the 1967 war [U.N. Security Council 
Resolution – 1967].  Their stance had therefore not changed since they had already 
been supporting the Arab cause prior to 1973.  If anything, the British position was one 
of neutrality; during the 1973 war Great Britain placed an arms embargo on Israel as 
well as Arab countries and once fighting stopped they resumed arms sales to both sides 
[Licklider, 1988].  Similarly, Japan had also supported Resolution 242 prior to 1973 
and had even supported a UN resolution recognizing the rights of Palestinians in 1970 
[Licklider, 1988].  The Arab countries further demanded that the Japanese end 
diplomatic and economic relations with Israel while supplying Arab countries with 
weaponry [Licklider, 1988], none of which was granted.  Japan did not sever ties with 
Israel and was prohibited to sell weapons due to their post-WWII constitution.  The 
Japanese did, however, agree to give Arab countries economic assistance, promised to 
start new joint ventures and agreed to bilateral deals [Yergin, 1991].  The United States, 
subjected to the embargo the longest, did not make any significant concessions either.  
American plans for a cease-fire and subsequent peace process (including American 
involvement) was already being prepared before the oil embargo was even declared, 
and no major shift in American foreign policy has been noted in the Middle East either 
during the 1973 crisis or in the decades that followed.  Finally, despite the oil embargo, 
the Western world continues it support for Israel with the United States in particular 
providing large amount of aid in the form of military supplies.  Growth of Israeli 
settlements on Palestinian land is still a highly contentious issue, as is the independence 
of Palestine.  Lasting change, therefore, does not seem to have occurred as a result of 
the oil weapon.  
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 The Arab countries seem to have gained very little from the oil embargo in term 
of direct concessions.  The largest concessions would have to be the refusal of 
European Community countries to allow the United States to use their military bases in 
order to re-supply Israel [Licklider, 1988], a policy which has only been applied during 
the 1973 war.  Despite this apparent lack of tangible results the oil embargo did result 
in the Middle East gaining international attention.  Up until the 1967 and 1973 oil 
embargos, the Middle East was seen as a source of petroleum for international oil 
companies to exploit and little else.  Foreign oil companies operating in the Arab 
countries tried their best to dictate price and production levels in order to maximize 
their profits with little regard to the considerations of the nations within which they had 
been operating.  The oil embargos forced foreign nations to consider Arab views and 
created an environment where dialogue with Arab leaders was a necessity.  Oil gave 
Arab nations the necessary leverage to become internationally relevant and to no longer 
be viewed as backwards nations required to do the bidding of Western countries.  
Unfortunately for the Arab nations, the threat of the oil weapon was so great that 
Western countries realized they would need to increase cooperation with each other to 
lessen the leverage Arab countries had gained through their control of oil supplies.  
This cooperation led to the formation of the International Energy Agency in 1974. 
1.3 Response of Western Countries to the Oil Embargos 
For Middle Eastern and North African oil producing countries, oil meant a greater 
degree of power and prestige on the international scene.  The industrialized countries of 
Western Europe and North America were no longer energy independent and relied on 
Arab and Persian oil imports to maintain their economic growth.  This growing reliance 
on petroleum imports presented the oil producing countries with the means to influence 
Western foreign policy in the Arab world and to gain a larger voice in international 
affairs.  The producing countries did not count solely on the threat of supply 
interruptions to increase their profiles but proved they were more than willing to 
employ the oil weapon, as described above.  Although the countries participating in the 
oil embargo succeeded in gaining international attention, the effectiveness of the oil 
embargos in imposing profound foreign policy changes is debated.  Moreover, the 
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embargo had the lasting effect of highlighting the elevated risk of relying on the 
unpredictable countries of the Middle East and North Africa.  The willingness of oil 
producing countries to exploit their relative power in energy supplies proved to 
Western nations that their oil security was in jeopardy and it resulted in efforts to 
mitigate the threat of future embargos.  The industrialized countries realized they would 
need to attempt energy conservation policies while also improving coordination and 
cooperation between themselves in the event of a future oil supply interruption.  The 
latter effort resulted in the creation of the International Energy Agency (IEA). 
Following the 1973 oil embargo, Western nations realized they would need to limit 
the growth of energy consumption in order to improve their oil security.  During the 
embargo the United States launched “Project Independence”.  In the words of President 
Richard Nixon, the goal was to “ensure that by the end of this decade, Americans will 
not have to rely on any source of energy beyond our own” [Kraemer, 2006].  Oil 
imports did initially drop, from 6.25 Mb/d in 1973 to 6.05 Mb/d in 1975, however by 
1979 it had risen to 8.45 Mb/d [EIA Petroleum Navigator].   President Jimmy Carter 
declared energy independence to be a vital issue for national security and in an effort to 
better manage American energy policy he created the U.S. Department of Energy 
[Kraemer, 2006].  Oil imports did stay under 6 Mb/d between 1981 and 1985, but over 
the following 20 years oil imports were forced to increase due to the unabated growth 
of oil consumption.  Between 1985 and 2008 American consumption of crude oil and 
petroleum products increased from 15.7 Mb/d to 19.5 Mb/d, a 24% increase [EIA 
Petroleum Navigator].  With domestic oil production in decline, oil imports over the 
same period of time increased 153%, from 5.1 Mb/d to 12.9 Mb/d (Figure 2 [EIA 
Petroleum Navigator]).  In fact, oil consumption boomed worldwide; global oil 
consumption increased by 25.7 Mb/d between 1985 and 2008 [EIA International 
Energy Statistics].  To satiate this growing level of consumption, the world was forced 
to turn to the largest source of oil, OPEC.  As can be seen in Figure 3, OPEC exports of 
crude oil increased from 12.9 Mb/d in 1986 to just under 25 Mb/d in 2005.  Not only 
were Western nations unable to decrease import reliance, they actually increased 
OPEC‟s share of oil supplies and their power over the world oil market. 
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Decreasing OPEC member countries‟ share of global oil exports proved impossible, but 
increased cooperation amongst Western countries was achieved.  To combat against the 
oil weapon and potential future oil supply interruptions, the Western countries created 
the IEA in 1974.  Today the main role of the IEA is as an energy policy advisor to its 
member countries
2, however its formation was initially intended to “co-ordinate 
measures in times of oil supply emergencies” [IEA: About the IEA].  This function of 
the IEA is still an important asset to its member countries.  The number of oil exporting 
countries is falling and as production becomes concentrated among fewer countries the 
world is faced with a greater threat from the oil weapon.  Oil embargos are not the only 
source of potential supply disruptions, however.  There is a precarious balance in global 
supply and demand of oil, even small supply disruptions from wars, piracy at sea, 
terrorist attacks or catastrophic weather events can have a large economic impact.  
Figure 2: Crude Oil Imports     Figure 3: OPEC crude oil exports     
(thousand barrels per day)                1986-2008 (thousand barrels per day) 
   
Source: EIA International Energy Statistics    Source: EIA International Energy Statistics 
 
Most of these concerns, however, originate in the Middle East; over the past 40 
years 90% of oil lost from supply disruptions has been from Middle Eastern countries 
(Figure 4 [IEA Oil Supply Security, 2007]).  To combat against supply interruptions the 
IEA uses a number of response measures.  The primary defence against a supply 
interruption is to draw oil from the stockpiles of IEA member countries.  Holding 
                                                          
2
 IEA member countries as of 2009: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States 
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stocks of oil equivalent to 90 days of net imports is a requirement of every non-oil 
producing IEA member country.  Total stocks now stand at 4.1 billion barrels of oil, 
enough to cover 122 days of net imports [IEA Oil Supply Security, 2007].  Additional 
oil supplies can also be obtained through an increase in the production of oil.  This 
measure, however, is quite limited among the IEA members who do not have the 
luxury of spare capacity.  In a time of crisis member countries are also asked to reduce 
their oil consumption through demand restraint and switching to fuels other than oil 
where possible.  Demand restraint works either through public campaigns, such as 
asking people to drive less and decrease residential heating, or can come through 
government imposed supply restrictions.  Fuel switching is limited in sectors such as 
transportation (where no alternative to gasoline exists), however some savings can be 
made in other sectors such as power generation.  Austria, for example, can switch 5-7% 
of their consumption of oil to natural gas while other countries like the Czech Republic 
and Ireland can switch between 3-10% [IEA Oil Supply Security, 2007].  The ability of 
the IEA to effectively respond to a supply crisis using these measures was demonstrated 
in 2005 when oil installations in the Gulf of Mexico were damaged by Hurricane 
Katrina.  The hurricane affected both the oil production and refining capabilities of the 
United States causing an estimated loss of 1.5 Mb/d.  IEA member countries reacted 
quickly and decisively by brining an additional 60 million barrels of oil to market [IEA 
World Energy Outlook, 2009].  The response quickly stabilized the world oil market 
and made up for any loses in the United States. 
Figure 4: Loss of Oil from Major Oil Supply Disruptions since 1957 (Mb/d) 
 
Source: IEA Oil Supply Security, 2007 
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 The ability of the IEA response system to deal with a major oil supply 
disruption can be debated.  The daily loss of oil from Hurricane Katrina was less than 
from any of the other major disruptions listed in Figure 4, and lost capacity in the 
United States was restored as quickly as possible.  Another oil embargo would result in 
a larger loss of oil, and more worryingly would last for an indefinite amount of time.  
Regardless of the IEA‟s ability to overcome an oil embargo, the agency still provides a 
mechanism to at least partially offset the power of the oil weapon.  Since its inception 
the role of the IEA has grown.  The agency also tries to enhance the energy security of 
its members by influencing policy changes, promoting economic development and 
improving environmental protection.  Although attempted energy reforms in the 1970s 
and 80s were ineffective, new energy reforms appear more promising.  Growth in oil 
consumption among OECD countries by 2030 is predicted to remain relatively flat 
[OPEC World Oil Outlook, 2009] or even slightly decline [IEA World Energy Outlook, 
2009 and EIA International Energy Outlook, 2009] and the IEA member countries‟ 
share of global oil consumption will fall to 36% by 2030, much less than the 68% in 
1974 when the agency was founded [IEA World Energy Outlook, 2009]. 
Sadat‟s goal of initiating dialogue through the 1974 embargo may have had 
some short-term successes.  The long-term view, however, has shown that Western 
countries have continued to look inward for energy security.  Until recently, increasing 
oil consumption and imports was a necessary evil in order for the industrialized 
countries to continue their economic growth.  This may have increased their reliance on 
the oil producing countries but it did not diminish American or European support for 
Israel, nor did it lastingly improve relations with Middle Eastern countries. 
1.4 Russia, Oil and Politics 
The use of oil supplies in a realist framework can also be observed in modern-day 
Russia.  Following the collapse of the U.S.S.R. it was natural to expect that Russia 
would undergo many changes in its political and economic structure.  Soviet collapse 
seemed to imply that Western style capitalism had „won‟ the battle over communism 
and resulted in the privatization of many Russian state-owned enterprises for a fraction 
of their true value.  The transition from an authoritarian government and a state-
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controlled economy was far from smooth.  Falling commodity prices, an over-valued 
ruble and high public debt levels all contributed to the Russian financial crisis of 1998.  
The financial crisis resulted in $30 billion of foreign currency reserves being used to 
prop up the ruble, caused most of the big Moscow based banks to fail, GDP to fall by 
4.9% and inflation to reach 84% [Pinto et al, 2004].  The financial crisis also saw the 
end of Boris Yeltsin‟s Presidency and the rise to power of Vladimir Putin.  As 
President, Putin once again consolidated power in the Kremlin and has used Russia‟s 
supplies of oil and natural gas as a tool of power to advance his domestic and 
international agendas.   
The potential threat from Russia is substantial due to their large energy reserves and 
their current control over Central Asian energy sources.  Russia is the second largest 
producer of both oil and natural gas in the world, with the 8
th
 largest oil reserves and 
the largest natural gas reserves [EIA International Energy Statistics].  During the 
Yeltsin administration the federal government did not have great control over the 
energy industry as more authority was transferred to regional governments.  Regional 
governors were able to influence the domestic energy industry through a principle of 
“two keys” whereby licenses for the exploration and production of oil and natural gas 
required approval from both the regional government and the federal Ministry of 
Natural Resources [Suhomlinova, 2007].  This arrangement favoured smaller, 
independent energy companies located in energy-rich regions which were given 
preferential treatment from the local governors.  Competition for licenses resulted in an 
increase in the number of energy companies and by 2000 the Russian oil and gas 
industry was comprised of 14 large companies and 120 independents [Suhomlinova, 
2007].  Putin‟s administration realized that the “two keys” principle and the vast array 
of energy companies made it more difficult for the Kremlin to control the energy 
industry and they set about changing the licensing laws.  A license granted to the small 
company Severnaya Neft in 2001 proved to be the catalyst which enabled change.  The 
oil majors, upset at not being granted the license, did not believe the license was fairly 
awarded and brought the case to the Russian courts.  Although the majors would 
ultimately be unsuccessful with the court case, they were the primary beneficiaries from 
the 2004 amendment to Subsoil Law no. 123-FZ which removed the „two keys‟ 
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principle  and strengthened Federal control over the energy industry [Suhomlinova, 
2007].  Without the backing of regional governments, the independent companies were 
forced to fight for licenses against the energy majors, a battle they were never likely to 
win.  The oil industry went through a great deal of consolidation as the large companies 
merged and bought out smaller companies leaving the Russian industry with only four 
oil majors (LUKOIL, Surgutneftegaz, TNK-BP and Rosneft) and 2 regional companies 
(Tatneft and Bashneft), with the share of output from independent companies falling 
from 12% in 1999 to 4% in 2005 [Suhomlinova, 2007].  Another important 
development was the re-nationalization of Gazprom and the acquisition of Yukos 
subsidiaries by the state-owned Rosneft.  Gazprom, privatized in 1993, is a crucial asset 
for the Russian government because the company is responsible for approximately 20% 
of the world‟s natural gas production and partners with Central Asian companies to 
transport natural gas to Europe and China through Russian territory [Thornton, 2008].  
Rosneft is another powerful state-owned energy company.  It attained acquired much of 
the assets from the forced sale of Yukos following the politically motivated arrest of its 
former chief, Mikhail Khodorkovsky.  These two companies, in addition to the other 
energy companies active in Russia, are more than simply political tools; they also 
account for 25% of the industrial output, 33% of the federal budget and 50% of hard 
currency earnings in Russia [Gidadhubli, 2003].   
The line between politics and business is highly blurred in Russia.  Energy 
companies, as a direct consequence of their strategic importance in international affairs, 
are expected to fall in line behind the Kremlin and, where possible, advance the foreign 
policy aims of the country.  When President Putin proposed greater cooperation in the 
gas sector between Russia and Turkmenistan in 2002 he did not send a government 
bureaucrat, rather it was Gazprom Chairman Alexei Miller who met with Turkmen 
President Niyazov [Gidadhubli, 2003].  Energy company executives tempted to oppose 
the Kremlin are wise to consider the fate of Mikhail Khodorkovsky.  Although 
officially accused of tax evasion and the stealing of state property, many believe the 
arrest of Russia‟s richest oligarch has more to do with non-business related issues 
including his vocal opposition to Putin‟s politics, financial support of opposition 
political parties and the purchasing of the Moskovskiye Novosti newspaper [Francetti, 
27 
 
2008 and BBCNews June 16, 2004].  Dissent from many other energy executives is 
unlikely, however, since many of the executives have close allegiances to the Kremlin 
and have held important political positions.  The governor of the energy rich region of 
Chukota from 2000 until 2008 was Roman Abramovich [Gidadhubli, 2003] who is 
better known as the former head of Sibneft (which was sold to Gasprom in 2005).  
Abramovich was not the only executive to hold governorship; Boris Zolotarev was the 
Governor of Evenkia in addition to being the Vice-President of the former Yukos oil 
company [Suhomlinova, 2007].  Other notable examples include Vagit Alekperov 
(current President of LUKOIL and formerly the Deputy Minister of Oil and Gas) Viktor 
Chernomyrdin (Chairman of Gazprom, Prime Minister of Russia from 1992-1998 and 
Ambassador to the Ukraine from 2001-2008 [Suhomlinova, 2007]) and Igor Sechin, 
(Chairman of Rosneft and the former deputy Chief of Staff for Vladimir Putin 
[Franchetti, 2008]).  Energy executives also represent Russia in non-governmental 
positions, such as Mikhail Friedman who is the Chairman of the Board for the oil 
company TNK-BP and serves on the International Advisory Board of the Council of 
Foreign Relations [CFR, International Advisory Board].  The political appointment of 
energy executives with close ties to the Kremlin ensures that energy companies will not 
interfere with government leadership when oil or natural gas are used as political 
leverage in negotiations.  Concretely, this can take the form of agreeing to make 
investments in pipeline routes through countries friendly with Russia or to cut-off 
supplies to nations acting contrary to Russian wishes. 
 Russia has utilized political control over energy supplies by reducing or cutting 
off supplies to the Ukraine several times over the past four years.  The most serious 
supply disruption came in January 2009 when all natural gas shipments to the Ukraine 
were stopped due to a dispute over a $600 million debt Ukraine owed to Russia for late 
payments [Cohen, January 2009].  Fallout from the cut-off extended past Ukrainian 
borders as Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Croatia, Serbia and Turkey all 
experienced a halt in their gas supplies just as winter temperatures were dropping [CBC 
News, Russia cuts all gas exports to Europe, 2009].  Russia was well aware of the 
consequences of their actions since Europe receives a quarter of its natural gas imports 
from Gazprom, with 80% of those imports coming through the Ukraine [Cohen, 
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January 2009].  Russia‟s drastic actions call into question whether or not the sole issue 
was debt repayment.  The cut-off was a way of creating distrust in Ukraine‟s pro-
Western leaders, President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko, 
ahead of 2010 elections while affirming that Ukraine remains in Russia‟s sphere of 
influence [Cohen, January 2009].  Latvia, another former Soviet country, has also 
experienced problems relying on Russian transport agreements as oil shipments through 
the LatRosTrans pipeline were briefly stopped in 2003.  The decision to stop oil 
shipment through the LatRosTrans pipeline was a method of demonstrating Russian 
frustration with Latvia for building closer relations with Europe and threatening 
Russian security by joining NATO [Gidadhubli, 2003].  As Europe ushers in 2010 it is 
bracing yet again for the prospect of an energy supply crisis, Russia is threatening to 
stop oil shipments to Europe which run through Belarus [Kramer, 2010].  Until January 
1, 2010 Belarus had been the beneficiary of an oil price subsidy which earned the 
country billions of dollars in revenue through selling Russian oil at a profit to Europe.  
The subsidy was meant to keep Belarus firmly within Russian control by bolstering the 
regime of Aleksandr Lukashenko.  Russia, however, has decided not to renew the 
subsidy in response to apparent Belarusian attempts at rapprochement with Europe.   In 
2009 Belarus agreed to join the EU‟s Eastern Partnership, a program meant to build 
closer ties between the EU and post-Soviet countries Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine [Pop, 2009].  Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, has 
expressed Russia‟s displeasure over the Eastern Partnership program calling it a means 
of extending the EU sphere of influence further east [Pop, 2009].  Belarus further 
irritated Russia by failing to support Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, territories within Georgian borders, as independent states.  It can be assumed 
that, much like the crisis with Ukraine, a new supply contract will be signed between 
Russia and Belarus, albeit at a much higher rate.   
It is too early to know whether or not oil shipments to Europe will be affected 
due to the Belarus-Russia dispute, however the it once again calls into question the 
ability of nations to rely on energy supplies shipped through Russia.  The willingness of 
Russia to use energy supplies for political manoeuvrings has led both Europe and China 
to seek ways of lessening their dependence on Russian pipelines.  The first step in 
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Europe‟s effort to bypass Russia was the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline.  As 
is implied by the name, the pipeline starts in the Caspian Sea port of Sangachal near 
Baku, Azerbaijan and crosses through Georgia on the way to the Turkish port of 
Ceyhan (see Annex 1).  Measuring 1,737 km in length [BBC News Sept. 17, 2002], the 
BTC pipeline was the first link between the Caspian and Mediterranean Seas and has a 
capacity of 1 Mb/d [Cohen, 2005].  The pipeline was not designed to exclusively 
transport Azerbaijani oil as it also gives Kazakhstan a non-Russian alternative for 
shipping oil to Europe.  The Nabucco pipeline is another step in plans to mitigate 
Europe‟s dependence on Russia energy supplies.  The pipeline is a direct challenge to 
Russia which has been trying to hold onto Gazprom‟s monopoly of supplying natural 
gas from Central Asia to Europe [Kramer, 2009].  Construction on Nabucco will begin 
in 2011 and is projected to take four years to complete whereupon is will supply Europe 
with 31 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year [Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project].  
The scope of this project shows how desperate Europe is to diversify energy sources.  
The pipeline will travel 3,300 km through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary 
before ending in Austria, with an estimated cost of €7.9 billion (Annex 1[Nabucco Gas 
Pipeline Project]).   Although Chinese energy supplies from Russia have not yet been 
subjected to threats of interruption, China has surely been paying attention to the events 
in Europe.  Chinese energy consumption is projected to increase dramatically over the 
next 20 years and so Chinese energy companies have been scouring the globe in an 
effort to secure energy contracts.  Despite their urgent need to secure energy supplies 
China is wary of depending too heavily upon Russia.  China has decided to take 
proactive measures to prevent a Russian monopoly on energy supplies flowing 
eastwards by building a pipeline to Xinjiang from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan.  The 1,800 km pipeline is scheduled to be completed in 2013 and will 
play a significant role in meeting China‟s energy needs in the future; the pipeline will 
carry 40 billion cubic meters of natural gas a year, equivalent to half of China‟s current 
consumption [Kramer, 2009].  It is impossible to conclusively state that Chinese and 
European construction of these pipelines would not have been undertaken had Russia 
proven more reliable.  It is clear, however, that Russian intimidation has definitely 
created concerns in Europe and China over the security of energy supplies coming from 
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Russia.  These concerns have helped ensure that the large pipeline projects would go 
ahead.  Russia‟s energy reserves guarantee that they will remain important suppliers to 
Europe and China but their tactics have prevented them from maximizing the value of 
those reserves.  Better relations with other nations could have resulted in greater 
cooperation with Russia at building a larger export capacity to Europe and China. 
1.5 Liberalism in the American-Canadian Oil Trade 
The United States and Canada have formed a deep relationship which extends 
much further than simply being geographic neighbours.  Current relations between the 
countries are excellent as both enjoy the benefits from having good political 
communication and deep economic ties.  Unlike the realist framework which defines 
the relations between OPEC oil producers and Western nations, or between Russia and 
its neighbours, the American-Canadian relationship is defined by liberalism.  Greater 
integration between the two countries has come through trade liberalization which 
began in 1965 with the signing of the U.S.-Canada Auto Pact and was further 
accelerated with the agreement of the bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) of 1989.  
The FTA was later expanded to include Mexico when Canadian Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney, American President George H.W. Bush and Mexican President Carlos 
Salinas agreed to sign the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the 1
st
 
of January 1994.  NAFTA has formed one of the largest free-trade areas in the world 
and covers a region with a combined population of over 444 million people and 
economic output of US$17 trillion [Nafta Now,, see Annex 1].  The FTA and NAFTA 
have also defined the guidelines of the energy trade and established laws which the 
member countries have agreed to abide by.  Establishing bilateral trade laws in the 
critical energy sector builds further confidence that Canada can play a vital role in 
enhancing American oil supply security over the long-term.  
 Throughout the 20
th
 century relations between the United States and Canada 
were relatively peaceful.  While wars raged in Europe, Africa, and many other parts of 
the world, North American relations never deteriorated to the point where armed 
conflict was considered.  Relations between Canada and the United States, however, 
have also faced their difficulties from nationalistic ambitions.  As the center of the oil 
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producing world began to shift to the Middle East in the mid-20
th
 century, American oil 
producers sought protection to preserve their domestic market.  Canada, originally 
exempted from oil import restrictions by the Eisenhower Administration in 1959 
[CERA Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands, 2009], had surcharges levied on its oil 
exports to the U.S. by President Nixon in 1971 [Finlayson, 1984].  Although these 
surcharges were meant to control American inflation and were applied equally on every 
importer, for many Canadians it signalled that the special relationship with the United 
States was over [Finlayson, 1984].  There was no immediate response from the 
Canadian government to the surcharge, however it changed Canadian perceptions of 
cross-border trade and investment, by the end of the decade foreign control of Canadian 
industries had become a highly debated subject.  Many Canadian industries were 
largely in the hands of foreign firms by the beginning of the 1980s; 45.6% of 
manufacturing was controlled by foreign firms, heavy machinery 55.4%, and 
transportation equipment 73.4% [Finlayson, 1984].   The oil and gas industry was no 
exception; 62.7% was controlled by foreign firms with American firms controlling 
47.4% [Finlayson, 1984].  In an attempt to regain control over the energy industry the 
Liberal government of Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau created the National 
Energy Program (NEP) in 1981.  The NEP was an attempt by the government to 
“Canadianize” the domestic oil industry by reducing the level of foreign ownership and 
increasing the stake of the federal government in energy production.  To the United 
States, the NEP sounded similar to the nationalization trends which removed 
multinational oil firms from countries like Mexico, Libya and Iran, among others.  The 
goal of the NEP was to have at least 50% Canadian ownership of the energy industry 
by the end of the 1980s and it resulted in straining the relationship with the United 
States [Finlayson, 1984].  The situation risked getting out of control with the threat that 
the two neighbours could become increasingly protectionist.  By the end of the decade 
Canada had reversed its course and agreed to a free trade agreement with the United 
States. 
 The FTA and NAFTA epitomize the neoliberal framework which has 
come to define the Canadian-American relationship since 1990.  The overall objective 
behind the FTA, and then NAFTA, was to improve regional cooperation and expand 
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trade by strengthening the rules and procedures of intra-continental trade.  One of the 
primary ways of meeting this objective was to “eliminate barriers to trade in, and 
facilitate the cross-border movement of, goods and services between the territories of 
the Parties” ([NAFTA, Chapter 1 Article 102] see annex 1).  The process of tariff 
elimination between the United States and Canada started under the FTA and most 
tariffs have been eliminated since January 1, 1998.  Under NAFTA, tariff elimination 
on Mexican goods and services was accelerated and by January 1, 2008 virtually all 
tariffs between Canada, the United States and Mexico had been eliminated [Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade Canada, Tariff Elimination].  The results oin the 15 
years since NAFTA came into effect have shown encouraging signs that the overall 
objective is being met.  Since NAFTA was agreed to, North American merchandise 
trade has more than tripled to US$946.1 billion in 2008 and employment levels have 
risen 23% creating a net gain of 39.7 million jobs. [Nafta Now].  These gains from free 
trade have resulted in the combined GDP of the NAFTA partners more than doubling, 
from US$7.6 trillion to US$17 trillion. 
The free trade agreements have strengthened Canadian-American relations by 
de-politicizing trade in most sectors.  The result has been a large increase in trade with 
“Canadian merchandise exports to the United States [having grown] at a compounded 
annual rate of almost 6.3% between 1993 and 2008” [Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade Canada, Foundation for Canada‟s Prosperity]  with total merchandise trade more 
than doubling.  The trade in services, though much smaller than merchandise, also more 
than doubled from CDN$42.2 billion to CDN$91.3 [Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade Canada, Foundation for Canada‟s Prosperity].  The most important goods and 
commodities that are traded include autos, auto parts, computer equipment, aircraft 
equipment, lumber and energy.  Total trade has grown to the point where more than 
US$1.6 billion in goods crossed the border every day in 2008 making Canadian-
American trade the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world [Fergusson, 2009].  
Of all the items which are traded, none are as vital to the national economies as oil.  As 
the world‟s largest consumer of oil the United States is dependent upon imports of oil 
and oil products to meet their consumption needs.  Saudi Arabia, Mexico and 
Venezuela have all traditionally been large oil suppliers to the United States, but since 
33 
 
2004 Canada has been the largest supplier.  Increased investments in the oil sector, 
particularly in the oil sands region of Alberta, has resulted in Canadian oil production 
and exports substantially increasing.  From 1990 to 2007 total Canadian production of 
oil has increased from 2.04 Mb/d to 3.42 Mb/d while exports to the U.S. have increased 
from 0.93 Mb/d to 2.46 Mb/d, see Figure 5.  Investments in Canadian oil production 
will continue to increase over the coming decades which should increase Canadian 
output to approximately 5 Mb/d (see Section 4.5 for details).  Such an increase in 
Canadian oil production creates the possibility that Canada could supply an even 
greater percentage of oil than the 19% of total U.S. imports it currently supplies [CERA 
Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands, 2009].  Increasing oil exports to the United States 
carries few risks for Canada since oil is such a highly sought after commodity.  Global 
demand for oil is projected to grow by over 20 Mb/d between 2008 and 2030 with the 
greatest amount of growth coming from China and India [IEA World Energy Outlook, 
2009].  In the highly unlikely scenario where the United States would ban Canadian oil 
imports, Canada could easily sell its oil to Asian markets.    Although Canada‟s pipeline 
infrastructure is currently setup to service the American market there is already a plan 
in place to build a pipeline from the oil producing area in Alberta to the Pacific port of 
Kitimat, British Columbia.  Once completed the Enbridge Northern Gateway pipeline 
will be able to carry 525,000 b/d to the Pacific coast [Northern Gateway Pipelines].  
Shipped by tankers, Canadian oil would be able to accommodate a portion Chinese and 
Indian demand growth which is projected to increase by 8.6 and 3.9 Mb/d respectively 
by 2030 [IEA World Energy Outlook, 2009].  For the United States, the risk of 
increasing oil supply dependence on Canada could theoretically exacerbate current 
American oil supply security problems.  As demonstrated with the examples of the 
Arab oil producers and Russia above, increased dependence on Canada could make the 
United States more vulnerable to oil supply disruptions originating in Canada.  This, 
however, is highly improbable for a number of reasons.  First of all, the two countries 
are connected through a series of pipelines which make the United States the most 
natural destination for Canadian oil exports.  Although the Enbridge Northern Pipeline 
could ship oil to Asian markets, it can just as easily ship oil to the lucrative Californian  
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Figure 5: Canadian Oil Production and Exports to the U.S. (thousand barrels per day) 
 
Source: EIA International Energy Statistics 
market which is a far more attractive prospect for Canadian oil producers.  Canadian oil 
producers do not make any money shipping oil so their net returns are highest when 
selling oil to closer markets [Guly, 2005].  Maximizing revenue not only in the best 
interest of the oil producers; the federal government receives 43% of the revenue from 
the oil sands and the government of Alberta receives 36% [Guly, 2005].  It is therefore 
in the federal and provincial governments‟ best financial interest to sell greater volumes 
of oil to the United States.  The most important issue, however, remains NAFTA.  The 
United States can feel secure in increasing their reliance on Canadian oil due to chapter 
6 of NAFTA which explicitly covers the trade in oil and other sources of energy.  
Articles 603, 604 and 607 prohibit the imposition of taxes, quotas, or quantitative 
restrictions in the energy trade.  Barring an unexpected national emergency or war, the 
Canadian government cannot legally reduce oil exports to the United States. This 
agreement is beneficial for both parties; the United States is assured of access to 
Canadian oil supplies while Canada is assured of access to the American market.  
Finally, the United States can rely on Canada as a secure source of oil.  The Energy 
Security Index compiled by Energy Security News and the Washington Post rated 
Canada as the most secure energy producing country in the world [DeBard, 2009].  
According to the study the Canadian oil exporting industry suffers the least potential 
disruption from “government or internal strife, terrorist attack or a sudden inability to 
ship by sea” [DeBard, 2009].  As a result of the neoliberal framework provided by 
NAFTA, in addition to other factors mentioned, the United States can feel secure 
increasing oil imports from Canada and will see their oil supply security improve. 
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CHAPTER 2: GLOBAL SUPPLY AND PRODUCTION OF OIL 
 
If there is one certainty in the oil industry it is that the Earth‟s supply of oil will one 
day run out.  The hydrocarbon-rich substance we know as crude oil was formed 
underground from the remains of plants and animals that were subjected to geological 
heat and pressure in a process that took millions of years.  At the current rate of 
extraction of 85.4 million barrels per day (Mb/d) [EIA International Energy Statistics], 
the remaining lifespan of global oil supplies can be measured in decades.  Although 
disagreements abound among politicians, environmentalists and energy industry 
executives, they all concede that the Earth‟s endowment of crude oil is a non-renewable 
resource which must be properly managed.  One of the most contentious issues in the 
energy industry, however, is the ability of remaining global oil reserves to meet future 
demand.  Considerable debate exists about when the world will reach the point of peak 
oil production with the most pessimistic of forecasts claiming that we are presently at 
the peak with future oil production sure to decline due to physical limits.  The more 
optimistic reports assert that global oil reserves are more than sufficient to meet the 
rising demand up to the year 2030 and perhaps beyond.   Since crude oil is the single 
most important source of energy it is therefore of paramount importance for decision 
makers to know which of these reports is more accurate.  Furthermore, in certain 
sectors such as transportation there is not as yet any substitute for oil in the near-to-
medium future thus making reliable oil supplies vital for national economies.  This 
chapter will first describe the status of current global oil consumption and will 
subsequently elaborate on peak oil theory.  Pessimistic projections published by the 
Energy Watch Group (EWG) and by Frederik Robelius will then be compared to the 
reports from international organizations such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
and the Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA).  Although the era of cheap 
and abundant oil has past, it seems most likely that current oil reserves will be able to 
meet future demand so long as the necessary investments are made and energy 
conservation in taken seriously.  Although oil will in all likelihood continue to be the 
most important primary source of energy up to the year 2030, its total share of energy 
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consumption will decrease.  Other energy sources, particularly natural gas and 
renewable energies, will see their importance increase as the world continues to lessen 
its dependence on energy derived from oil. 
2.1 The Shift to the Oil Age 
“It is the material energy of the country, the universal aid, the factor in everything 
we do.”  This was how the nineteenth century economist W.S. Jevons had described 
coal [Yergin, 1991].  As the predominant source of energy in the 19
th
 century, coal had 
fuelled the Industrial Revolution.  Without coal the unprecedented industrial growth 
would not have been possible and this was clear to Jevons: “With coal almost any feat 
is possible or easy; without it we are thrown back in to the laborious poverty of early 
times” [Yergin, 1991].  As the industrial economies of 19th century Europe continued to 
grow, so did their energy requirements.  More factories were built and the production of 
goods was expanded, none of which would have been possible without the use of coal.  
For the first time in human history energy, almost exclusively derived from fossil fuels, 
became the life-blood of the economy and thus of individual countries as well.  Coal, 
however, had one very large drawback; pollution.  Perhaps more so than any other city, 
Manchester came to epitomize the problems with coal and the industrial revolution.  In 
the 17
th
 century Manchester, England was a pretty market town that primarily traded in 
linens and later, cotton.  The cotton industry, as well as Manchester itself, was 
completely transformed as large mills and factories were constructed in the 19
th
 
century.   This transformation was fuelled solely by coal shipped via the canal from 
Lancashire, and soon enough Manchester was stained black from the burning of coal in 
factories and train engines.  Despite the environmental drawbacks, coal remained the 
primary source of energy until the mid-20
th
 century.  Of the total energy consumption is 
Western Europe in 1955, 75% was provided by coal and only 23% by oil [Yergin, 
1991].  Oil, however, has the advantage of being easier to handle and is more 
environmentally sound compared to coal.  While these advantages were surely 
considered, the widespread conversion from coal to oil was mainly a consequence of 
economics; increased global oil production resulted in oil becoming cheaper than coal.  
Of all the factors this one was the most critical.  Energy intensive industries gained a 
37 
 
competitive advantage by switching to oil and by 1972 60% of total energy use in 
industrialized countries was derived from oil whereas coal‟s share had dropped to 22%.  
This was a complete reversal in only 2 decades.  Between 1948 and 1972 the increased 
consumption of oil in the industrialized nations was phenomenal; U.S. consumption 
tripled to 16.4 million barrels per day (Mb/d), Western European consumption 
increased 15 fold to 14.1 Mb/d, and in Japan consumption increased from 32,000 
barrels per day to 4.4 million, a 13,750% increase [Yergin, 1991]. 
The growth of energy consumption has continued unabated following the mass 
conversion from coal to oil use in the beginning to mid 20
th
 century.  In 1973 the total 
(global) final energy consumption was 4,675 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe).  The 
following 3 decades saw the demand for energy grow at an average annual compound 
rate of 1.7% and in 2007 total global energy demand was 77% greater than in 1973 for 
a total final energy consumption of 8,286 Mtoe [IEA Key World Energy Statistics 
2009].  Figure 6 below shows the increase in energy consumption by fuel between 1971 
and 2006. 
Figure 6: Evolution of world total final consumption by fuel (Mtoe) 
 
Source: IEA Key World Energy Statistics, 2009 
Electricity generation from hydro-dams, nuclear power plants as well as the 
growth of renewable energy has enabled the world to diversify its sources of energy 
away from fossil fuels.  Oil, however, continues to be the most important source of 
energy today.  Although the share of oil in total global energy consumption has 
decreased over time from 48.1% in 1973 to 42.6% in 2007, oil still accounts for a much 
larger share than any other fuel type (see Figure 7).  Furthermore, while the total share 
of oil may have decreased the absolute quantity of oil consumed has greatly increased.   
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Over the 34 year period the average annual increase in the demand for oil was 1.34% so 
that in 2007 56% more oil was consumed compared to the 1973 levels; an increase of 
1,281.17 Mtoe. 
The rise in oil consumption enabled a monumental change in living standards 
and expectations to occur.  Increased vehicle ownership meant that families were no 
longer restricted to using public railway transportation nor required to live in city 
centers.   New homes built in the suburbs which ringed metropolitan areas were 
equipped with all sorts of new appliances and gadgets, all of which required electricity.  
Plastic goods, made from petrochemicals, soon infiltrated homes and work places, and 
the factories that produced all of these new consumer 
Figure 7: Fuel Shares of Final Consumption in 1973 and 2007 
 
Source: IEA Key World Energy Statistics, 2009 
 
goods were increasingly being powered by oil.  Nowhere, however, was the impact of 
oil greater than in the transportation industry.  Between 1949 and 1972 the number of 
motor vehicles in the United States increased from 45 million to 119 million, while the 
total outside the United States went from 18.9 million to 161 million [Yergin, 1991].  
Today the number stands much higher; according to the 2007-08 World Motor Vehicle 
Market Report there were 789.8 million motor vehicles on the road in 2005, or 
approximately one car for every 8 people.   The increase in the number of vehicles 
resulted in a drastic increase in the share of oil being used in the transport sector.  From 
1973 to 2007 the share of oil used in transportation increased from 45.4% to 61.2% (see 
Figure 8 below).  This trend is expected to continue as the number of vehicles, 
particularly in China, continues to increase over the next several decades. 
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Throughout the 20
th
 century it was fairly uncomplicated for suppliers to meet 
the growing demand for oil supplies.  Conventional oil sources from the Middle East to 
the United States to Venezuela were more than enough to satisfy the demand.  In fact, 
before the oil crisis of 1973 the biggest problem in the industry was over supply.  
Discoveries of massive oil quantities were made across the Middle East and northern 
Africa in the middle part of the century and every nation was eager to profit from their 
natural endowments.  Although critical to the economies of consuming nations, for the 
producing countries oil provided a valuable source of foreign currency in addition to 
“power, influence, significance and status” [Yergin, 1991].  As such, the producing 
nations started to compete with one another for greater market share of their oil, and 
Figure 8: Oil Consumption by Sector in 1973 and 2007
 
Source: IEA Key World Energy Statistics, 2009 
 
in order to do so they increased production and would often cut the price of oil.  The 
result was an explosion in the world oil supply, from 8.7 Mb/d in 1948 to 42 Mb/d in 
1972 [Yergin, 1991].  Even more remarkable was the enormous regional shift in the 
location of oil fields.  Despite the United States increasing production by 4 Mb/d over 
that time period, the US share of total world oil production plummeted from 64% to 
22% [Yergin, 1991].  The reason for this drop was that oil production in the Middle 
East over the corresponding period had gone from 1.1 Mb/d to 18.2 Mb/d, an increase 
no one could have foreseen when prospectors first started exploring the region at the 
beginning of the century. 
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The rise in oil production throughout the 20
th
 century has been nothing short of 
remarkable.  Despite oil embargoes and wild price fluctuations during the 1970s the 
overall demand and production of oil did not wane over the long term.  Oil production 
declined over the first half of the 1980s but rebounded before the end of the decade for 
an overall increase from 64 Mb/d in 1980 to 66.4 Mb/d in 1990.  By the year 2000 oil 
production was at 77.8 Mb/d and further increased to 85.4Mb/d in 2008 (see Figure 9). 
The overall production trend seen in Figure 9 clearly points in an upward direction, 
however it would be wrong to simply extrapolate future oil production based on past 
experiences.  Oil demand in the future will depend on a number of factors unrelated to 
the physical supply of oil.  Many countries have already drafted legislation to curb the 
use of fossil fuels or are in the process of doing so in a bid to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions.  Oil importing countries are also diversifying energy sources away from oil 
in order to improve their energy security and diminish the power of the exporting 
countries.  However as conventional oil reserves continue to diminish considerable 
debate exists about the ability of global oil supplies to meet future demand.  Estimates 
of recoverable global oil reserves vary according to sources greatly influencing 
projections of future availability.  It is widely assumed that almost all of the giant oil 
fields have already been found with most new discoveries likely to be smaller than 10 
Gb.  Large sources of unconventional oil have been identified but require new 
technological advances in extraction and refining before large volumes can be 
produced.  One such source is the Canadian oil sands where new refining processes are 
required to create a synthetic crude oil from the molasses-like mixture of sand, water 
and bitumen.  Several kilometres offshore from Brazil, oil rigs are pushing 
technological limits by digging several kilometres below the sea level, through layers of 
hard rock and salt which are more than one thousand meters thick in some areas, in 
order to reach the Tupi oil field.  These new technologies require huge investments 
which may not be made in time to avoid an oil supply crisis.  The many challenges and 
potential problems faced by the oil industry questions whether or not the world supplies 
are sufficient.   
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Figure 9: World Oil production 1980-2008 (thousand barrels per day) 
 
Source: EIA International Energy Statistics 
2.2 Peak-Oil Theory and Hubbert’s Curve 
 The incredible spike in oil prices in 2008 brought with it a lot of discussion 
about whether there remains enough oil to meet global demand.  Between 2006 and 
mid-2007 the price of oil traded between $55 and $68 per barrel with a high of $71.45 
per barrel during the second week of August 2006 [EIA
 
Petroleum Navigator].  Starting 
in mid-July of 2007 the price began climb ever higher until reaching an all-time high of 
$136.32 exactly one year later in the third week July 2008 [EIA
 
Petroleum Navigator].   
The high prices dominated news headlines and caused panic among the oil importing 
nations.  By the end of 2008 prices had relaxed and by the end of December 2008 a 
barrel of oil traded at $35.99, its lowest level since the third week of 2004 [EIA
 
Petroleum Navigator].  Not only did the massive fluctuations in the price of oil have a 
negative impact on many nations‟ economies, it also made many people think about the 
possibility of a scarcity of oil in the near future.  One of the earliest attempts at 
predicting the oil peak
3
, however, was done at a time when the average person was 
blissfully unaware of the potential scarcity of oil.  In the mid 1950s M. King Hubbert, a 
geophysicist for worked for Shell Oil before joining the U.S. Geological Survey, looked 
at the increase in the production of oil both in the United States and on a global scale 
and could read the writing on the wall.  Between 1880 and 1930 the United States 
production of oil steeply increased at a yearly rate of 7.9% with a doubling of output 
every 8.7 years, as shown in Figure 10 [Hubbert, 1956].  The overall increase in global 
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 The “Oil Peak” refers to the point in time when oil production reaches its maximum rate before 
beginning an irreversible decline 
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oil production rates closely matched those in the United States with a yearly increase in 
production of 7% and a doubling of output every 10 years, see (Figure 11 [Hubbert, 
1956]).  By the end of 1955 the cumulative production of crude oil in the United States 
was approximately 53 billion barrels.  What is interesting to note is that the first half of 
the 53 billion barrels took 80 years to be produced (1859-1939) while the second half 
was produced in only 16 years [Hubbert, 1956].    Hubbert realized this upward trend in 
production levels could not last forever leading him to develop a model of peak oil 
known today as “Hubbert‟s curve”.   
Figure 10: U.S. production of crude oil   Figure 11: World production of crude oil 
                   (1860-1950)           (1860-1950) 
  
       Source: Hubbert, 1956             Source: Hubbert, 1956 
 
 Hubbert started with the knowledge that the only known production points are 
at time t=0 and t= , the points when the level of production is equal to zero.  He then 
used simple calculus to derive a possible bell-shaped production curve, as seen in 
Figure 9 (see annex 2 for Hubbert‟s calculations).  The shaded area under the curve is 
equal to the total amount of the resource that can be extracted from the ground while 
the curve represents the rate of production.   His basic premise was that once oil 
production began in a new oil field the rate of production would rapidly increase, as 
had already been observed in various oil fields around the world (Figures 10 and 11).  
Production can be expected to increase until physical limits prevent further expansion 
of production with the peak occurring sometime at the point where 50% of the well 
reserve had already been extracted.  After a short peak and plateau, production would 
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decrease at approximately the same rate at which it had previously increased (see 
Figure 12). 
Figure 12: Mathematical Relations involved in the complete cycle of  
production of any exhaustible resource 
 
Source: Hubbert, 1956 
 
Hubbert applied his theory using the oil data available at the time to predict when the 
U.S. and global oil production peaks would occur.  Despite objections from his 
employer, Shell, Hubbert came out with his prediction that US oil production would 
peak in the early 1970s in a 1956 at a meeting of the American Petroleum Institute in 
San Antonio [Deffeyes, 2008].  According to Kenneth Deffeyes, Professor Emeritus of 
Geology at Princeton University and a former colleague of Hubbert‟s, the prediction 
was rejected by almost everyone both inside and outside the oil industry [Deffeyes, 
2008].  For the next decade and a half Hubbert‟s critics seemed justified in their 
critique as American oil production continued to increase from approximately 7 Mb/d 
in 1955 to over 11 Mb/d in 1970 [EWG, 2007].  With the advantage of hindsight it is 
now known that Hubbert‟s prediction was very accurate and U.S. oil production peaked 
in 1970.  Approximately 3.5 billion barrels of oil were produced in the US in 1970 
before production fell to 3.45 billion barrels the following year with the trend 
continuing thereafter [EIA Petroleum Navigator].    
 Given that Hubbert‟s prediction of the U.S. production peak was remarkably 
accurate, consideration should be given to his global production predictions.  Without 
the advantage of the technology and accumulated knowledge available to today‟s 
geologists, Hubbert was forced to make certain assumptions on global oil reserves and 
on the maximum future production rate.  He estimated total global reserves of 1,250 
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billion barrels (Gb) and a maximum rate of yearly production of approximately 12.5 
Gb.  Using these assumptions he calculated that global peak production would occur in 
the year 2000, see Figure 13 [Hubbert, 1956].   
Figure 13:  Hubbert‟s global oil peak production prediction 
 
Source: Hubbert, 1956 
Current data shows that Hubbert‟s calculation of a peak occurring in the year 2000 was 
inaccurate.  Production statistics for the years 2000 to 2007 show that the production of 
oil has not yet leveled off, see Figure 14 below.  Statistics provided by four different 
sources show that production of oil has continued to increase since the year 2000, albeit 
at a much slower rate than during the 1950s when Hubert was making his predictions.  
Although it appears as though Hubbert‟s prediction of a global peak in the year 2000 
has been off the mark, it must be kept in mind that his prediction was made 40 years 
earlier.  The assumptions used in his theory were founded on educated assumptions that 
were based on the history of oil production up to 1956.  The largest source of error in 
Hubbert‟s calculation was in his estimation of total global oil reserves.  In his 1956 
study he estimated that there were 1,250 Gb of global reserves.  Current estimates from 
BP show global reserves at the end of 2007 to be 1,238.892 Gb, while World Oil‟s 2007 
year-end estimate was 1,184.208 Gb [EIA World Proved
 
Reserves of Oil and Natural 
Gas].  According to the Oil & Gas Journal global reserves are even greater; 1,342.207 
Gb as of January 1, 2009 [EIA World Proved
 
Reserves of Oil and Natural Gas].  Oil 
reserves are therefore estimated to be greater in 2009 than they were in 1956 despite the 
fact that approximately 900 billion barrels of oil were extracted over those 50 years.  
The reason is that oil reserve estimates are frequently updated as new oil fields are 
discovered and as more knowledge about remaining oil fields is accumulated.  
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Advances in technology have enabled oil companies to gain a better understanding of 
the shape and size of oil fields so that the volume of oil is better estimated.  
Technological advances have also helped oil companies extract oil more efficiently 
than ever before so that greater volumes of oil can be pumped out of every well.  
Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) techniques have been developed whereby water or gas 
is pumped into an oil field further enhancing oil recovery.  Oil production is no longer 
constrained to on-shore drilling either, with deep water rigs making oil fields off the 
coast of Africa and Norway accessible for extraction.  Hubbert‟s lack of precision can 
well be understood given that he was using the best data available to him in 1956.  It 
should however be noted that his model and the assumption of the bell-shaped curve is 
remarkably accurate at describing the pattern of oil extraction (see Annex 2 for 
examples).   In spite of Hubbert‟s miss estimation, it is possible that a global production 
peak may still occur in the near future.  If we exclude the first set of years and focus on 
the years 2005-2009 we see that there is actually a contraction in global production 
levels (see Figure 15).  It cannot be conclusively argued that this small drop in 
production rates shows any clear pattern that implies a peak of global production.  
Unfortunately it is impossible to know with any certainty whether this recent fall in 
production is a product of exogenous factors such as high oil prices, supply disruptions, 
wars or recession, or is in fact the first sign that we have already reached peak 
production.  If the global economy begins to recover from the financial crisis in 2010, it 
can be expected that oil demand will recover as well.  Only when production is 
incapable of meeting demand can it be stated as fact that the world has passed the oil 
peak.  Despite the erroneous assumptions included in M. King Hubbert‟s model for 
global oil production he is not alone in predicting an oil peak occurring at the beginning 
of the 21
st
 century.  Other studies, most notably the supply outlook provided by the 
Energy Watch Group (EWG) and the doctoral thesis of Frederik Robelius, have 
respectively estimated that the global peak in oil production will occur sometime 
between 2006 and 2008. [EWG, 2007 and Robelius, 2007).   
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Figure 14: Global oil production rates 2000-2007 (thousand barrels per day) 
 
Sources: BP Statistical Review 2009, Eni World Oil and Gas Review 2008, OPEC annual statistical bulletin 2008, EIA 
International Petroleum Consumption 
Figure 15: Growth rates of oil production between 2004 and 2007 
 
Sources: BP Statistical Review 2009, Eni World Oil and Gas Review 2008, OPEC annual statistical bulletin 2008, EIA 
International Petroleum Consumption 
2.3 From Hubbert to the Energy Watch Group 
 In his 1956 paper Nuclear Energy and the Fossil Fuels, M. King Hubbert drew 
the analogy that finding oil fields followed the same pattern of discovery as that of land 
in the 16
th
 century.  In uncharted waters explorers were most likely to first discover the 
largest pieces of land, continents.  After the continents were drawn maps had to be 
continually revised as other smaller discoveries were made.  Over time, as geographical 
knowledge progressed, the size of the discoveries were continually smaller until all that 
was left to find were the smallest, least habitable islands.  Figure 16 shows the 
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discoveries of New Field Wildcats
4
 since 1920 and demonstrates that Hubbert‟s 
analogy was not misplaced.  Burgan (in Kuwait) and Ghawar (in Saudi Arabia) are two 
of the largest oil fields in the world and were discovered in 1938 and 1948 respectively 
[EWG, 2007].  Many oil fields have been discovered in the years since those massive 
finds, but the average size of new discoveries have been getting progressively smaller.  
Between 1960 and 1970 the average size of a new discovery per New Field Wildcat 
was 527 million barrels (Mb) whereas between 2000-2005 the average size declined to 
20Mb [EWG, 2007].  Figure 17 shows the declining average size of field discoveries 
since 1940.  These numbers may be somewhat troubling for the oil industry but do not 
in themselves prove that the world will face an immediate oil shortage.  When Ghawar 
was discovered in 1948 oil exploration was still at an early age and was taking place 
almost exclusively in the United States.  Geologists at the time did not have a great 
amount of knowledge as to where oil fields could exist and therefore it is most likely 
that exploration during that time would yield either a massive find or nothing at all.  
The result of finding fewer, but larger, oil fields is that the average size of these fields 
would end up being large.  However in the decades since the discovery of the giant oil 
fields in the Middle East exploration has intensified and spread out around the world.  
New technologies in exploration have enabled the discovery of a greater number of oil 
fields regardless of size.  The experience of the Occidental Oil Company in Libya is a 
case in point.  In search of new reserves Occidental decided to place their bets on the 
newly accessible oil fields in Libya where significant oil deposits were believed to 
exist.  Occidental had managed to acquire fields Number 102 and Number 103 but 
faced early adversity as the first few wells turned up dry.  Undaunted Occidental 
soldiered on and was rewarded with a significant discovery in the most unlikely of 
spots, right under a former Mobil Oil base camp [Yergin, 1991].  The same blocks of 
land had previously been awarded to Mobil Oil, who after not finding any oil decided 
to relinquish their rights to the land.  Using newly developed seismic mapping 
Occidental was able to find oil where others had failed.  Exploration technology has 
progressed since Occidental used seismic mapping in 1966 and this has enabled the 
                                                          
4
 New Field Wildcat: A new oil field located on a structure which has not produced oil before and which 
is far from other producing fields [Louisiana Energy Topic, 2002] 
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discovery of greater numbers of smaller fields.  As the number of smaller finds 
increases it will inevitably cause the average size of oil fields to decrease and disguise 
the discovery of larger fields.  The discovery of the Kashagan oil and gas fields in the 
year 2000 in Kazakhstan illustrates this point.  The average size of offshore discoveries 
was 10 Gb (see Figure 17) yet the Kashagan field is estimated to contain anywhere 
between 13 Gb [Cardais, 2008] and 38 Gb [Yenikeyeff, 2008].  While it is interesting 
to notice the decreasing size of average fields, it is of significantly greater importance 
to know the total size of recoverable oil reserves.  It is from these total reserve numbers 
that future production estimates can be properly estimated. 
Figure 16: Discovery of New Field Wildcats   Figure 17: Average size of New Field 
                    Wildcats 
  
Source: EWG Crude Oil Supply Outlook, 200                   Source: EWG Crude Oil Supply Outlook, 2007 
 
As the production of petroleum continues to increase so too does the strain on 
the worlds‟ remaining oil fields.  Ultimately any level of consumption of a finite natural 
resource such as petroleum is bound to be unsustainable.  Although the level of past 
and current consumption is a known variable, estimates of when global oil production 
will peak is still uncertain due to the different estimates of world oil reserves.  Although 
the Earth has been endowed with a fixed amount of oil the estimates of the quantity that 
geologists are confident can be extracted vary quite substantially.  Figure 18 shows 
seven different estimates of global oil reserves.  Six out of the seven estimates show 
reserve numbers greater than 1,150 Gb.  The lone exception is the estimate from the 
Energy Watch Group (EWG) which believes the world reserves total only 854 Gb.  The 
estimate of 854 Gb by EWG is 27% smaller than the next lowest estimate and 39% 
smaller than the largest estimate, a significant difference.  Due to this very low estimate 
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it is no surprise that EWG also has the most pessimistic projections of future oil supply.  
It must be questioned, however, at how they arrived at their number.  The report by the 
EWG claims to use  
Figure 18: Estimates of World Oil Reserves (Gb) 
 
Sources: (a,b) EWG, 2007 EWG, 2007 (c) BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2009 (d,e,f) EIA World Proved 
Reserves of Oil and Natural Gas (g) Eni World Oil and Gas review 2008 (h) OPEC annual statistical bulletin 2008 
 
reserve numbers from the IHS
5
 database, but they also claim to use their own 
assessments for the Middle East, USA, Canada, Mexico, Brazil and Russia.  These 
countries are also the largest current oil producing areas in addition to being the areas 
with the greatest potential to further increase output in the future.  Without exception 
the reserve estimates by EWG have been revised downwards and in no region was the 
revision as pronounced as in the Middle East.  While most estimates of Middle Eastern 
oil supplies rely on official Figures released by the producing nations, the EWG 
believes these Figures have been artificially inflated which leads them to estimate that 
only 362 Gb remain in the Middle East reservoirs as opposed to the industry database 
(IHS) Figures of 677 Gb. [EWG, 2007] This assumption has some merit due to the 
structure of production agreements between OPEC member countries.  Each member 
country is only allowed to produce a specific amount of oil in relation to the size of 
their oil reserves.  As the reserve numbers of one country increase, it negatively affects 
the production level of the other countries.  There is therefore ample motivation for all 
member countries to increase reserve estimates once others have done so too.  If, for 
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 IHS is a publicly traded company that provides business information services in 4 principle areas; 
Energy, Product Lifecycle, Security and Environment.  Among their companies is the Cambridge Energy 
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example, Saudi Arabia announces their reserves have increased by 10% in a given year 
then there is the temptation for Iran, Venezuela or any of the other members to 
announce a similar growth in reserves to prevent Saudi production from increasing at 
the expense of the other members.  Further complicating matters is the fact that there is 
little transparency in the oil industries of OPEC countries.  Oil data is seen as an issue 
of national security in many Middle Eastern countries and as such foreign monitors are 
not given access to the oil fields.  However the EWG fails to adequately explain how 
they arrived at their estimates while also making unsubstantiated claims.  They fail to 
provide any source to back-up their claim that; “it is a fact that more water is pumped 
into the [Ghawar] field than oil is extracted”. [EWG, 2007]  Furthermore, when 
executives of the Saudi national oil company Aramco stated that they would be able to 
maintain a production of 10 Mb/d until the year 2042, EWG noted that this would only 
be possible should Saudi proved reserves be 260 Gb, “which they definitely are not”.  
However 260 Gb is exactly what sources including BP, the Oil and Gas Journal, I.H.S, 
World Oil and the EIA all estimate Saudi reserves to be [EIA, World Proved Reserves 
of Oil].  Finally, as oil exploration continues and new fields in the Gulf of Mexico, the 
Arctic, offshore from Brazil and elsewhere are more accurately understood it is most 
likely that global oil reserve numbers will continue to be revised.   
Using their numbers the EWG believes peak oil production “occurred in 2006 
with a peak production of 81 Mb/d” and “oil production will decline by about 50% until 
2030”, see Figure 19. [EWG, 2007]  However the projections made by EWG must be 
seriously questioned.  The fact that their revised reserve numbers differ so drastically 
from all other estimate is reason enough to question their validity.  EWG claims to be 
an independent association of researchers and economic experts but there are reasons to 
question whether or not the reports they publish are biased against the oil industry.  
EWG was founded by Hans-Josef Fell, a member of Germany‟s Bundestag 
(Parliament) for the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen party (Alliance‟90/The Greens)  As a 
member of Parliament Mr. Fell has worked hard to promote the adoption of renewable 
energy sources and to increase the percentage of energy that comes from renewable 
sources in Germany among other environmental causes.  Renewable energy would be 
an ideal solution for our future energy needs and will hopefully one day meet all of our 
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energy needs.  However it seems as though the report published by EWG provides Mr. 
Fell with the type of “scientific” support he needs to promote his agenda.  As such it 
cannot be held as very credible and other sources must be used to gain a true 
understanding of future oil production potential. 
Figure 19: EWG projection of energy supply to 2030 
 
Source: EWG, 2007 
2.4 Robelius’ Estimate of Future Oil Production 
  In his doctoral thesis entitled Giant Oil Fields: The Highway to Oil, Frederik 
Robelius calculated his own projections of future oil production.  To arrive at his 
conclusions Robelius chose to analyze all giant oil fields currently in production in 
addition to expansions of old fields and new field developments.  For his study he 
determined that a giant oil field is one that will ultimately produce at least 0.5 Gb of oil 
over the lifespan of the reserve.  The total number of oil fields in the world has been 
estimated to total 47,500, of which only 507 are giant oil fields [Robelius, 2007].  430 
of these fields are currently in production while the remaining fields are in various 
stages of planning.  The overall importance of these giant oil fields is quite remarkable.  
Of the 2,250 Gb of ultimately recoverable resources estimated by Robelius, 
approximately 65% is located in the giant oil fields.  Thus, while giant oil fields make-
up only a small percentage of total oil fields they contain most of the recoverable oil 
(see annex 2 for a list of the 20 largest oil fields in the world).  The giant oil fields are 
also responsible for most of the world‟s oil production; in 2005 61% of the world‟s oil 
was produced in the 312 giant oil fields and 21 smaller fields which produced at least 
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100,000 b/d [Robelius, 2007].  This would suggest that the most important factor in 
determining peak oil is thus the future production of the giant oil fields. 
 As opposed to the single projection made by EWG, Robelius presented 4 cases; 
a worst case, standard case (low end), standard case (high end), and best case.  His 
results, shown in Figure 20 below, show a peak occurring as soon as 2008 in the worst 
case scenario to 2018 in the demand-adjusted best case scenario.  The consequence for 
production by the year 2030 is quite significant; in the worst case scenario production 
drops to approximately 50 Mb/d while in the best case scenario is approaches 70 Mb/d.  
In 2008 global oil production reached 85.5 Mb/d [EIA International Energy Statistics], 
meaning that Robelius is projecting 2030 oil production to be anywhere from 15.5-35.5 
Mb/d lower than it is today.  This would cause a great struggle between nations for 
remaining oil supplies and would be extremely damaging the United State‟s oil 
security.  With China and India both poised to continue consuming greater quantities of 
oil the United States would need to ensure that their current oil suppliers, particularly 
Canada, increase production and guarantee oil supplies. 
Figure 20: Potential Oil Peaks Calculated by Robelius 
 
Source: Robelius, 2007 
2.5 Projected Oil Demand Growth to 2030 
 Reports such as the ones from the EWG and Robelius demonstrate that there are 
serious concerns about the physical supply of oil being able to meet rising demand over 
the next 20 years.  The uncertainties regarding oil reserve estimates coupled with the 
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profitability of the oil industry can create an atmosphere of complaisance where short-
term gains are more important than long-term viability.  Oil industry insiders have been 
caught off-guard before; Hubbert‟s prediction of a peak in American oil production in 
1970 was largely denounced before being proven true.  Despite being caught off-guard 
by the limitations of domestic oil production the American economy was not harmed 
due to the ability to import oil.  However the failure to foresee a global peak in oil 
production would have enormous economic consequences on all oil importing nations.  
There does not as yet exist an adequate substitute for oil, particularly for transportation, 
and as such the prospect of an oil supply shortage should be taken seriously.  That 
being said, oil supply up to the year 2030 will be able to meet demand should the 
necessary investments in pipelines, refineries, and production facilities be made.  
According to forecasts by influential organizations in the petroleum and energy sector 
such as the International Energy Agency (IEA), Cambridge Energy Research 
Associates (CERA), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and 
the Energy Information Administration (EIA) there will not be an oil peak between now 
and 2030.  Each of the organizations forecast a rise in the demand for oil with 
production being able to meet demand up to the year 2030.  As opposed to historical 
trends, future demand growth will not be spurred on by OECD countries but will come 
primarily from China and India.  As demand continues to increase, however, the oil 
security of petroleum importing nations will be further compromised as the number of 
oil exporting nations shrinks and supply routes continue to be the targets of terrorist 
attacks. 
 The supply of oil faces many potential constraints including “economics, costs, 
service sector capability, geopolitics, the timing and nature of government decision 
making, and, centrally of course, investment” [Jackson, 2009].  Global reserve 
estimates have almost doubled since the 1980s and are not believed to be a constraint 
on the availability of supply.  While most of this increase has come from revisions of 
oil reserves in OPEC countries, the volume of new discoveries has been greater since 
the year 2000 than during the 1990s [IEA World Energy Outlook, 2008].  Though 
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estimates vary, the earth is thought to have approximately 1,281.4 Gb
6
 of reserves left, 
a sufficient amount of reserves that will be able to sustain demand if above-ground 
factors are favourable [IEA World Energy Outlook, 2007, Jackson, 2009, OPEC World 
Oil Outlook, 2009].  By 2030 it can be expected that the demand for oil will be more 
than 20 Mb/d greater than in 2008 assuming a growth rate of 1% or less.  Although oil 
production declined from 2005 to 2007, production is forecasted to grow at 1% per year 
average until 2030 with total production between most likely in the range of 105-106.6 
Mb/d, see Figure 21 below for various estimates.  The forecast calculated by CERA is 
substantially greater than other projections and more in line with previous reports.  The 
115 Mb/d CERA expects to be produced by 2030 is similar to the 116 Mb/d projected 
by the IEA in their 2007 World Energy Outlook.  In the reports released since 2007 the 
IEA has felt the need to revise this projection downwards, first to 106 Mb/d [IEA 
World Energy Outlook, 2008] and then 105 Mb/d [IEA World Energy Outlook, 2009].  
The downward revision is due to “the impact of higher prices and slightly slower GDP 
growth, as well as new government policies.” [IEA World Energy Outlook, 2008]  New 
legislation in OECD countries, such as the Energy Independence and Security Act 
(EISA) which was passed in the United States in 2007, will have a great impact on the 
consumption of oil over the forecasted years.  In fact, oil demand from OECD countries 
is actually projected 
Figure 21: 2030 Oil Demand Projections (Mb/d): 
 
Sources: IEA World Energy Outlook 2009, EIA International Energy Outlook 2009, OPEC World Oil Outlook 2009, Jackson, 2009 
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 Average reserve estimates from the following publications: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2009 
, EIA World Proved
 
Reserves of Oil and Natural Gas, Eni World Oil and Gas review 2008,  OPEC annual 
statistical bulletin 2008  
105 106 105.6
115
100
105
110
115
120
IEA EIA OPEC CERA
55 
 
to drop by 2030 with all of the demand growth coming from non-OECD countries [IEA 
World Energy Outlook, 2009, OPEC World Oil Outlook, 2009].  The vast majority, 
approximately 80% [IEA World Energy Outlook, 2008], of non-OECD demand growth 
will come from Asia and the Middle East, as China and India will increase their 
consumption by approximately  8 Mb/d and 2 Mb/d over the next 20 years [EIA 
International Energy Outlook 2009].  Meanwhile consumption in Japan and OECD 
Europe is projected to decrease by an average of 0.4% and 0.2% [EIA International 
Energy Outlook, 2009], while oil consumption in the United States will be the same in 
2030 as in 2007 [EIA Annual Energy Outlook, 2009].   
 With demand increasing by over 20 Mb/d between 2008 and 2030 it is 
important to know where the supplies will come from.  OPEC countries account for 
70% of the world‟s total oil reserves [EIA Assumptions to the Annual Energy Outlook 
2009] and will therefore continue to play a crucial role in meeting demand.  Although 
the IEA believes “most of the increase in world output would need to come from OPEC 
countries” [IEA World Energy Outlook, 2009] it is most likely that OPEC will only 
increase production so as to maintain their current market share.  The EIA assumes 
OPEC production to total 43.8 Mb/d in 2030 [EIA International Energy Outlook, 2009], 
a level that would allow OPEC to maintain its 40% share in global production.  The 
strongest indication that this is likely comes from OPEC itself which forecasts 2030 
production of 41.1 Mb/d of crude oil and 49.6 Mb/d of total liquid fuels production
7
, 
levels that would keep OPECs share of production close to the 40% mark [OPEC 
World Oil Outlook, 2009].  Expanding output from non-OPEC sources will be a 
difficult task since oil resources will become increasingly concentrated in fewer 
countries.  Of the 15 countries with the greatest potential to increase oil production 
between now and 2020, 11 are members of OPEC and only 2 (Canada and Brazil) are 
in the western hemisphere, see Figure 22.  Due to the advancements in extraction 
technology, unconventional oil production will increase and become a significant 
source of petroleum.  The EIA sees unconventional fuel supply increase by 10.4 Mb/d 
 
                                                          
7
 Total liquid fuel production includes NGLs (natural gas liquids), GTLS (gas-to-liquids) and crude oil. 
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Figure 22: The 15 Countries with the Greatest Potential to Increase Oil Production to 2020 
 
Source: CERA, Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands, 2009 
 
by 2030 with 9.6 Mb/d coming from non-OPEC sources such as Canada‟s oil sands 
[EIA International Energy Oulook,2009].  Although Canada‟s conventional oil 
production will decline by 1 Mb/d over the projection period, output from the oil sands 
will more than make up for the decline so that by 2030 Canada will produce 5.4 Mb/d 
[EIA International Energy Outlook, 2009].  Total non-OPEC conventional production 
will increase moderately, from 48 Mb/d in 2006 to 51 Mb/d in 2030 [EIA International 
Energy Outlook, 2009] with production increasing in the United States, Brazil, Russia, 
and Kazakhstan.   
2.6 Consequences for Oil Security 
 The expected changes in production patterns will have a negative impact on the 
oil security of many nations, particularly the United States.  Oil production will become 
increasingly concentrated in a smaller number of nations, most of whom are currently 
politically and economically unstable.  A quick look at Figure 22 above shows that 
most of the nations able to increase production are either unstable or have contentious 
relations with the United States.  If the United States were to rely on some these nations 
for substantial oil imports, they would forever be vulnerable to supply disruptions either 
from embargoes or terrorist attacks.  Russia, for example, is one country the United 
States is weary of doing business with.  Despite the end of the so-called “Cold War” 
American relations with Russia remain fragile.  Furthermore, Russia has gone beyond 
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simply issuing threats and has withheld energy supplies in order to advance their 
agenda, even at the expense of third parties.  In early 2009 Russia stopped all natural 
gas deliveries to the Ukraine, allegedly over pricing and payment issues, just as Europe 
was hit with colder than normal winter temperatures.  Pricing was not the only issue 
however.  During the Orange Revolution in 2004 Ukrainians protested an election 
believed by many to have been rigged in favour of the pro-Russian candidate Viktor 
Yanukovych.  Following a run-off election it was determined that the pro-Western 
candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, won the Presidential elections.  In the years following 
the Orange Revolution Russia has accused Ukraine of supplying Georgia with arms, 
particularly during the Russian-Georgian war over South Ossetia [Sanders, 2009].   
Cutting off the supply of natural gas to Ukraine was not only a way to renegotiate price 
and payment terms, it was also a strong signal to Ukraine not to interfere in Russian 
foreign affairs.  Caught in the middle were European countries which rely on Russia for 
approximately a quarter of their natural gas supplies, 80% of which comes through the 
Ukraine [Sanders, 2009].  In cutting off the gas supply Russia was also sending Europe 
a message not to engage itself in Russian geopolitical issues.  With Russian leaders 
having demonstrated their willingness to use hydrocarbon supplies as an instrument of 
power in geopolitical affairs, nations such as the United States would be wise to bypass 
Russia and seek oil supplies elsewhere.  The other options, however, are not necessarily 
any better.  Kazakhstan has an autocratic government and is one of the most corrupt 
nations in the world
8
, Iran is currently under U.S. and international economic sanctions 
due in part to its nuclear enrichment program, while Libya under the control of 
Muammar Gaddafi has been a highly unpredictable country.  Further south Nigeria and 
Angola are two countries that have recently emerged from civil wars and continue to 
suffer from violent attacks.  Their oil infrastructures have been targeted by militants 
and continue to be vulnerable to supply interruptions from the bombing of pipelines.  
Middle Eastern countries, despite having the largest oil reserves, have also proven to be 
unreliable oil suppliers as oil embargos and wars have disrupted the global oil supply a 
number of times (see Figure 4 in Section 1.3).  The greatest impact to American oil 
security comes from the threat of an embargo, as was experienced during the Six-Day 
                                                          
8
 Ranked 162
nd
 out of 180 nations in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2009 
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War in 1967 and the Arab-Israeli War of 1974.  Oil embargoes pose the greatest threat 
to American oil imports since they are applied in response to the particular action of a 
state or for specific political gains.  The embargo in 1974, for example, was done 
strictly for political motives “i.e. to alter Israeli policy to return territories captured in 
the 1967 war, to grant the „legitimate rights‟ of the Palestinians, and to alter the status 
of Jerusalem” [Licklider, 1988].  The subject of oil embargoes and oil security has 
already been examined in Chapter 1.   
 Potential supply and transportation problems will continue to threaten the 
United States however American oil security is not doomed.  American oil 
consumption will remain constant over the next couple of decades just as domestic 
production is set to increase for the first time since 1970 (see Chapter 3).  These two 
factors alone improve oil security as the gap between domestic oil consumption and 
production shrinks thereby requiring fewer oil imports.  Furthermore, the United States 
can turn to Canada for greater volumes of oil imports.  Already the largest supplier of 
oil to the United States, Canada is the only Western industrialized country among the 
15 countries able to expand oil production.  Canadian production will increase to over 5 
Mb/d by 2030 (see Chapter 4) enabling Canada to export more oil to the United States.  
Greater dependence on Canadian oil imports will improve American oil security by 
replacing oil imports from other, less secure, oil production countries.  The long history 
of good relations in addition to the deep economic ties between the two countries 
ensures that they will work together to achieve the common goal of greater energy and 
oil security.   
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CHAPTER 3: AMERICAN OIL SUPPLY SECURITY 
 
Since the end of the Second World War American economic and military strength 
have grown to the point where the United States has unquestionably become a world 
superpower.  In the four decades following the Second World War the United States 
was locked in a battle with the former Soviet Union for influence in international 
affairs, known as the “Cold War”.  The end of the Cold War was finally achieved not 
through war or military dominance but rather by the demise of the Soviet model which 
resulted in economic ruin and the dissolution of Soviet territory.  The United States, on 
the other hand, maintained its dominant position and became the sole world 
superpower, a position it would not have been able to reach without consuming vast 
amounts of energy and in particular crude oil.   
As the birthplace of the commercial oil industry, the United States was the first 
country to adopt petroleum as its chief energy source.  Throughout the 20
th
 century 
American economic growth was contingent on growing oil consumption until the 
economy became entirely reliant on oil supplies.  It is difficult to understate the 
importance of oil consumption in the United States; as former President George W. 
Bush proclaimed in the 2006 State of the Union address “America is addicted to oil” 
[Kraemer, 2006].  This “addiction” has resulted in the United States becoming the 
largest consumer of petroleum by a wide margin.  Unfortunately American domestic oil 
production has been in decline since 1970 and has thus been unable to match the rise in 
consumption.  Consequently, the United States has assumed the position as the world‟s 
largest importer of oil and has resulted in the United States being ranked as the least 
secure energy consuming nation in the Energy Security Index compiled by the 
Washington Times and Energy Security News.  The index ranks oil consuming 
countries based on their levels of domestic production and imports in addition to the 
source of their imports.  Not only does the U.S. import 12.9 Mb/d (2008 numbers [EIA 
Petroleum Navigator]) but they rely on countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq and 
Venezuela for their imports.  Imports from these countries are less secure due to 
potential geopolitical issues, terrorist attacks on oil installations, and transportation 
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disruptions.  New legislation introduced over the last two years in the United States, 
such as the Energy Security and Independence Act (ESIA) and a stricter Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE), will improve American‟s energy security by 
suspending the growth in oil consumption.  This will be achieved by mandating an 
increase in energy efficiency and greater use of renewable energies and biofuels over 
the next two decades.  To further improve their oil security the United States will need 
to consider options to boost domestic oil production which has been in decline since 
1970.  Available options include increasing oil production in the Outer Continental 
Shelf which has until recently been protected by legislative and federal bans and in the 
Arctic Natural Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) in Alaska.  Finally, expanding Canada‟s role 
as the largest oil exporter to the U.S. is also key to improving American oil security.  
The two countries have had good relations historically and enjoy the largest bilateral 
trade relationship in the world.  In addition to the economic and political stability of 
Canada, the network of pipelines connecting the two countries provide a much more 
reliable method of transporting oil compared to shipments via tankers from overseas 
countries.  As oil production increases in Alberta, the main oil producing province in 
Canada, the United States will be able to depend on Canada‟s reliable and secure source 
of oil to make up a greater share of total oil imports. 
3.1 American Oil Production 1859-Present 
The use of oil has been recorded in the Middle East in the time Before Christ where 
bitumen
9
 was a traded commodity used for many purposes; as building mortar, caulking 
for ships, road making and medicine [Yergin, 1991].  The use of oil as a medicinal 
product continued into 19
th
 century America where oil was believed to be a miracle 
cure for a diverse set of ailments such as headaches, toothaches, upset stomachs, and 
rheumatism [Yergin, 1991].  The real market potential for oil was not in medicine but 
as lamp fuel, however oil was not produced in sufficient quantities for this purpose.  Oil 
was observed to naturally seep into springs and salt wells in the north-eastern United 
                                                          
9
 Bitumen(1): “A naturally occurring viscous mixture, mainly of hydrocarbons heavier than pentane, that 
may contain sulphur compounds and that, in its natural occurring viscous state, is not recoverable at a 
commercial rate through a well.” EIA www.eia.doe.gov/glossary/glossary_b.htm 
Bitumen (2): “Petroleum that exists in the semisolid or solid phase in natural deposits.” Industry Canada 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ogt-ipg.nsf/eng/dk00048.html  
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States and the supply of oil at this time came from “skimming it off the surface of 
springs and creeks or by wringing out rags or blankets that had been soaked in the oily 
waters” [Yergin, 1991].  This would forever change in the mid-19th century in the 
village of Titusville, Pennsylvania.  In order to access larger volumes of oil George 
Bissell, who had recently formed the Pennsylvania Rock Oil Company, had the idea to 
modify drills used for salt-boring in order to drill for oil which would then be pumped 
to the surface.  Edwin L. “Colonel” Drake was sent to Titusville in December 1957 as 
the man in charge of making Bissell‟s vision a reality.  After enduring a year and a half 
of delays and disappointments, Drake finally struck oil on August 27
th
, 1859 [Yergin, 
1991].  The success in drilling for oil and the widespread adoption of kerosene as lamp 
fuel caused an immediate explosion in production.  500,000 barrels of oil were 
produced in 1860, a number that would jump to 3 million barrels in 1862 and over 4 
million barrels only 9 years later [EIA Petroleum Navigator].  From these humble 
beginnings emerged the modern oil industry. 
 Throughout the first half of the 20
th
 century American oil production expanded 
astonishingly quickly.  In 1900 total U.S. production was 174,000 b/d, ten years later 
574,000 b/d were produced and by 1920 the rate was greater than a million barrels per 
day [EIA Petroleum Navigator].  Between 1880 and 1930 American crude oil 
production increased at an annual rate of 7.9% with total output doubling every 8.7 
years [Hubbert, 1956], see Figure 23.    The rate of growth was phenomenal; by 1955 a 
total of 53 billion barrels of oil had been produced but while it took 80 years to produce 
the first half of this total the second half had been produced in only 16 years [Hubbert, 
1956].  As a geologist M. King Hubbert was aware that “although production rates tend 
initially to increase exponentially, physical limits prevent their continuing to do so” 
[Hubbert, 1956].  This realization led Hubbert to develop a theoretical model that was 
meant to approximate the year when oil production would peak in a single oil field, 
across a country or even on a global scale.  For a description of Hubbert‟s model and 
the “Hubbert Curve” please refer to Chapter 2, section 2.2. 
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Figure 23: American Field Production of Crude Oil 1900-1956 
(thousand barrels per day) 
 
Source: EIA Petroleum Navigator 
Hubbert‟s peak theory hypothesized that oil producing regions would follow a 
bell-shaped production curve such as the one in Figure 24 below.  The curve in the 
graph represents the rate of production over the life of the oil field.  Hubbert assumed 
that once half of the reserves had been extracted the rate of production would decrease 
at the same rate that it had previously increased thus creating a symmetrical curve.  The 
area below the entire curve equals the total recoverable reserves of the region, a figure 
that Hubbert had estimated between 150 Gb and 200 Gb for the entire United States.  
Using the data available at the time, Hubbert‟s calculations showed a peak in American 
production occurring in the early 1970s [Hubbert, 1956].  Although the logic of 
Hubbert‟s model was quite simple and straightforward, the conclusions drawn from the 
calculations were not accepted by the oil industry in general nor by Hubbert‟s employer 
at the time, Shell Oil.  Due to present his model at the American Petroleum Institute in 
San Antonio in 1956, Hubbert received repeated calls from the Shell Oil head office 
requesting him to refrain from submitting his predictions [Deffeyes, 2008].   Since this 
was not the first time someone had forecasted the demise of American domestic oil 
production many of Hubbert‟s contemporaries scoffed at his predictions.  At a time 
when the signs of production decline were not yet evident Hubbert was seen as yet 
another “false prophet” [Deffeyes, 2008].  The following 14 years only strengthened his 
critics as production continued to increase from more than 7 Mb/d in 1956 to over 9 
Mb/d by late 1969.  Many people in the petroleum industry felt there were ample 
reserves and that the advances in technology which were improving extraction methods 
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Figure 24: Hubbert‟s curve for American oil production  
 
source: Deffeyes, 2008 
and enabling the discovery of new fields would be able to maintain production growth 
into the future.  In 1971, however, the American oil industry was devastated; Hubbert 
had been correct.  Despite the best efforts of producers, oil production in 1971 could 
not match the 1970 level as production dropped from 9.637 Mb/d to 9.463 Mb/d [EIA 
Petroleum Navigator].  American oil production has never again reached the same 
levels as in 1970 and apart from a temporary boost in production during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s from the newly producing oil fields in Alaska, American oil production 
has been on a steady downward trajectory, see Figure 25.  In 2008 U.S. field production 
was 4.95 Mb/d, the lowest level since 1946.  Consumption trends, however, have not 
mirrored the production trends.  In spite of dwindling production capabilities American 
oil consumption has continued to increase throughout the 20
th
 century up until the year 
2005, requiring the U.S. to depend more on oil imports thus damaging their oil security. 
Figure 25: American Crude Oil Production 1900-2008 
(thousand barrels per day) 
 
Source: EIA Petroleum Navigator 
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3.2 The Growth of Petroleum Imports 
 Despite declining domestic crude oil production, the United States has 
continued to increase its consumption of crude oil and refined petroleum products.  
Consumption patterns were volatile during the 1970s however since the early 1980s the 
consumption trend has pointed in only one direction: upwards.  As can be seen in 
Figure 26, U.S. consumption increased from over 15 Mb/d in 1982 to 17 Mb/d in 1992 
and reached the unbelievable rate of 20.68 Mb/d in 2007 [EIA Petroleum Navigator].  
This prodigious level of consumption is far greater than any other nation, in fact it is 
44% greater than the combined consumption of all European Union Member States 
(14.38 Mb/d in 2007) [CIA World Factbook: EU].  In 2007 the U.S. consumed 2.6 
times more oil than the next highest sovereign nation, China, despite the fact that 
China‟s population is more than four times as great, see Table 1.  Environmental issues 
aside, this level of consumption would not be so problematic if the United States was 
able to match domestic production to demand.  However, as mentioned above, 
American petroleum production has been in perpetual decline and is nowhere near able 
to meet the demand.   
Figure 26: U.S. Consumption of Crude oil and          Table 1: Top 10 Oil Consuming  
Petroleum Products 1973-2008 (thousand barrels per day)                   Countries in 2007 
 
     
                              Source: EIA Petroleum Navigator Source:                                                     CIA World Factbook 
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The trend since 1970 is clearly evident, as oil production declined an increase in 
oil imports was required to bridge the gap between production and consumption, see 
Figure 27.  Not only has the gross volume of imported oil grown, the percentage of 
foreign oil to consumption has dramatically increased in only the past 30 years.  In 
1980 imports made up 40.5% of total consumption, a percentage that has increased 
every decade up until when imports accounted for 66.2% of consumption, see Figure 
28.These percentages clearly demonstrate American vulnerability to oil supply 
interruptions.  It would be absolutely impossible for the United States, even utilizing 
IEA emergency measures
10
, to be able to find alternative sources of oil in the event of a 
supply interruption due to an oil embargo.  At the current levels of consumption and 
importation the United States has a limited ability to achieve its foreign policy 
objectives should those objectives run counter to the ambitions of major suppliers such 
as Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and the rest of the OPEC block. 
Figure 27: U.S. oil consumption, production and imports since 1973 
(thousand barrels per year) 
 
Source: EIA Petroleum Navigator 
The United States imported 12.915 Mb/d of oil in 2009 and has relied upon many 
nations for its growing volumes of imported oil.  Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Mexico and 
Nigeria are among the largest sources of foreign oil coming to the U.S., however many 
people may be surprised to learn that Canada is in fact the single largest oil supplier to 
the United States.   Prior to 2004 Saudi Arabia was America‟s largest supplier of 
foreign oil with total sales of 629 million barrels of oil in 2003 with Mexico second at 
573 million barrels [see Annex 3 for data].  Oil imports from those two countries as 
                                                          
10
 IEA emergency response measures are described in Chapter 1 section 1.3 
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Figure 28: Percentage of Oil Consumption coming from Oil Imports 
 
Source: EIA Petroleum Navigator 
 
well Venezuela were highly volatile throughout the 1990s and 2000s.  In contrast 
imports from Canada remained on a steady upward trend, see Figure 29.  Canada 
eventually became the largest foreign supplier of oil to the United States in 2004 and its 
exports have continued to grow since then.  In 2008 Canada sold a total of 715 million 
barrels, or 1.956 Mb/d, of crude oil to the US, 30% more than Saudi Arabia which is 
the second largest oil supplier to the U.S. [EIA Petroleum Navigator].  Canadian 
petroleum exports to the United States in 2008 rise to 2.49 Mb/d when considering total 
petroleum imports, crude oil in addition to refined petroleum products
11
.  Canadian oil 
exports of 2.49 Mb/d in 2008 were more than 60% greater than the 1.52 Mb/d imported 
from Saudi Arabia, see Figure 30.  Canada is therefore the most important oil exporting 
country to the United States, accounting for 19% of total petroleum imports to the 
United States [CERA Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands, 2009].   
The growing share of Canadian imports has critical consequences on American 
oil security.  Canada is the only nation among the major American oil suppliers with a 
modern industrialized economy and a stable democracy.  With strong institutions and 
respect for the rule of law, Canada presents an ideal investment environment for 
American multinational companies, particularly in the lucrative energy industry.  This 
positive investment environment ensures that, depending on the market price of oil, the 
proper investments will be made in order to build and maintain oil production and 
transportation facilities across Canada.  Safe investment areas in the energy industry 
                                                          
11
 “Petroleum products include refinery gas, ethane, LPG, aviation gasoline, motor gasoline, jet fuels, 
kerosene, gas/diesel oil, heavy fuel oil, naphtha, white spirit, lubricants, bitumen, paraffin waxes, 
petroleum coke and other petroleum products through distillation” source: IEA, Petroleum Products 
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Figure 29: Oil Imports to the United States by country, 1990-2008 
(thousand barrels per day) 
 
Source: EIA Petroleum Navigator 
have become increasingly scarce as many energy-rich countries have either 
nationalized the energy sector or have attempted to marginalize the stakes of foreign 
energy firms operating in their territories.  With the largest natural gas reserves and the 
eighth largest oil reserves [CIA World Factbook: Russia], Russia became a much 
sought after market for foreign energy firms after the fall of communism.  During 
Vladimir Putin‟s time in power, however, Russia has sought to consolidate its control 
over the energy industry.  In 2006 Royal Dutch Shell was forced to sell its stake in the 
Sakhalin-2 oil and gas fields to state-owned Gazprom for alleged environmental 
breaches while BP was forced to sell its stake in the Kovytka gas field to Gazprom in 
2007 for less than market value [Cohen, 2007].  These in state interventions have made 
Russia an unreliable country within which to make significant investments.  Such 
interventions are highly unlikely to occur in Canada where investment agreements are 
respected because they are seen as necessary to safeguard the reliable exportation of 
crude oil and petroleum products to the American market.    Furthermore, America‟s oil 
security is additionally enhanced from high levels of Canadian oil imports as a result of 
the two countries agreeing to the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 1987 
and the subsequent North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994.  
NAFTA ensures that no party can “adopt or maintain any duty, tax or other charge on 
the export of any energy or basic petrochemical good” [NAFTA article 604] nor can 
any party “adopt or maintain a measure restricting imports of an energy or basic 
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petrochemical good” [NAFTA article 607] to another NAFTA country.  Since Canada 
is required to sell petroleum at market prices and cannot restrict oil exports to NAFTA 
signatories, the United States would be well advised to do what it can to increase 
imports of oil from Canada.  Unlike oil shipments from other countries which can 
fluctuate due to the internal politics or geopolitical considerations of the exporting 
nations, oil shipments from Canada are protected by law and are guaranteed to increase 
so long as overall oil production continues to increase and pipelines are built.  More 
details on the Canadian petroleum industry, including forecasts and challenges to 2030, 
are presented in Chapter 4. 
Figure 30: Top Sources of U.S. Petroleum Imports in 2008 
(thousand barrels per day) 
 
Source: EIA Country Analysis Briefs: Canada 
 
3.3 Projections of American Oil Consumption, Production and Imports to 2030 
The past several years have greatly altered the projections of American energy 
supply and demand by the year 2030.  Throughout the 20
th
 century and into the first 
decade of the 21
st
 century oil was the primary energy source which fuelled the growing 
American economy.  As described above, the situation progressively became more 
unsustainable; as domestic oil production continued to decrease oil imports increased 
out of necessity.  Through a series of legislative changes explored below, the United 
States can improve its energy security from 2007 to 2030.  Specifically, through the 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) and a more stringent Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE), oil consumption will cease climbing and remain at 
2008 levels.  Furthermore, the expiry of offshore drilling bans in 2008 gives the United 
States the potential to increase domestic oil production for the first time since 1970.  
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Moving forward the American economy will become far less dependent on oil imports 
from unstable foreign countries and will be more insulated from potential supply 
disruptions. 
3.3.1 Energy and Security Independence Act 
As the largest consumer of oil in the world the United States has long been 
conflicted on the issue of curbing oil consumption and reducing greenhouse gases.  
With uses in the industrial and commercial sectors, and most importantly in 
transportation, oil has become intricately linked to the American economy.  Political 
leaders have thus been loath to sign any agreements restricting oil consumption fearing 
that to do so would be economically disastrous.  One such international agreement is 
the Kyoto Protocol of 1997.  This protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is a binding agreement by industrialized 
nations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in order to achieve “stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” [UNFCCC article 2].  
Greenhouse gases are primarily generated through the burning of fossil fuels such as 
oil, coal, and gas, and therefore by limiting greenhouse gas emissions the protocol 
would force the United States to limit the consumption of fossil fuels.  The vast 
volumes of oil consumed in the U.S. have contributed to the United States becoming 
the largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world, responsible for almost a quarter of 
total emissions  [American Society of International Law, 2001].  The Kyoto protocol 
targets would have thus been more difficult for a carbon-intensive country such as the 
United States to reach and so despite signing the protocol on November 12, 1998 it was 
never ratified by the American government.  From early in the process the protocol 
faced American resistance on a number of issues including the use of market-based 
approaches to emissions trading, the means for counting carbon sinks as well the means 
for addressing non-compliance by a signatory. [American Society of International Law, 
2001].  However it is clear that the main American disagreement with the protocol is 
that none of the targets are binding on developing nations, specifically China and India, 
and that it places an unacceptable cost on the American economy [Sanger, 2001 and 
Revkin, 2005].  For several years thereafter it seemed as though the United States 
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would not sign any agreement that would force a change in behaviour and the 
increasing consumption of oil would continue unimpeded.  However new legislation 
introduced over the past couple of years will limit American oil consumption and 
encourage growth in renewable energies.   
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) “consists mainly of 
provisions designed to increase energy efficiency and the availability of renewable 
energy” [Sissine, 2007].  The 4 main provisions of the Act are; the Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy (CAFE), the Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS), energy efficiency 
equipment standards, and the repeal of oil and gas tax incentives.  These provisions aim 
to limit energy consumption by instituting incentives for conservation and setting new 
efficiency standards across all sectors; residential, commercial, industrial and 
transportation.   However, in order to wean the American economy off excessive oil 
consumption it is the transportation sector that will need to exhibit the greatest amount 
of change.  Globally the transportation sector was responsible for 61.2% of total global 
oil consumption in 2007 [IEA Key World Energy Statistics, 2009] and the percentage is 
even greater in the U.S. where the transportation sector accounts for approximately 
two-thirds of oil consumption [EIA Oil Demand].  The transportation industry uses a 
number of different fuels from diesel to jet fuel to residual fuel oil, however gasoline is 
by far the most important fuel and accounts for approximately two-thirds of the oil used 
in transportation [EIA Oil Demand].  As the primary fuel used in the sector that 
accounts for the majority of oil, gasoline is therefore the primary petroleum product 
consumed in the United States making up roughly 44.5% of total oil consumption.  As 
such, any government Act with the stated aim of reducing total oil consumption and 
GHG emissions would thus need to curb the consumption of gasoline.  The newly 
revised CAFE standards have been established to accomplish just that.  The new CAFE 
standards have set a target of 35 miles per gallon (6.72 liters per 100 kilometers) for the 
combined fleet of cars and light trucks for every auto manufacturer by the year 2020 in 
addition to establishing a fuel economy standard for medium- and heavy-duty trucks.  
This is a substantial improvement over current fuel efficiency standards which have not 
been revised since 1990 when the passenger car standard was set at 27.5 mpg (8.55 
l/100km).  Federal agencies also fall within the scope of the stricter CAFE standards; 
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they must decrease annual petroleum consumption by 20% and increase their 
consumption of alternative fuels by 10% over 2005 levels by 2015 [Sissine, 2007].   
Furthermore, Federal agencies are forbidden from acquiring any vehicle that is not a 
“low greenhouse gas emitting vehicle” as is defined under the new Act.  Further 
reductions in petroleum consumption will be made by replacing gasoline with 
renewable fuels as set forth by the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS).  The RFS sets 
minimum levels of renewable fuel that must be used in transportation, starting at 9 
billion gallons (34 billion litres) in 2008 and increasing to 36 billion gallons (136 
billion litres) by 2022 [Sissine, 2007].  This target is to be met through the use of 
advanced biofuels, specifically cellulosic ethanol and other feedstock biofuels not 
derived from cornstarch.  In 2008 the EISA was further reinforced by the passing of the 
Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 (EIEA).  In addition to providing 
incentives to increase the use of renewable energies and energy efficient appliances, the 
EIEA provides tax incentives to purchase plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) and 
to further increase the use of biofuels. The EISA, EIEA and the new CAFE standards 
are expected to change the types of vehicles sold and will have a significant impact on 
the consumption of gasoline, and therefore oil.  In 2030 60% of all new light-duty 
vehicles sold in the United States will be low-emission cars such as conventional 
hybrids, plug-in electric hybrids (PHEV) or will be equipped with E85 flex-fuel 
technology
12
. [EIA Annual Energy Outlook, 2009]  Due in part to higher sales of these 
more fuel efficient vehicles the consumption of petroleum-based motor fuels is 
projected to decline by 1.3 million barrels per day by 2030, a significant reduction.  
Although the quantity of gasoline and other petroleum-based motor fuels will decline, 
total liquid fuels
13
 consumed for transportation will be greater by approximately 1.7 
million barrels per day in 2030 than in 2007.  [EIA Annual Energy Outlook, 2009]  The 
reduction in gasoline will be more than replaced by the growth in diesel fuel and 
biofuels, each of which will be consumed at a rate 1.5 Mb/d greater day higher than in 
2007 [EIA Annual Energy Outlook, 2009], see Figure 31. 
 
                                                          
12
 E85 flex-fuel cars run on fuel which is compose of 85% ethanol and 15% gasoline 
13
 Liquid fuels refers to oil, diesel , ethanol, biodiesel and other biofuels. 
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Figure 31: Expected Change in Liquid Fuels Consumption (Mb/d) 
 
Source: EIA Annual Energy Outlook, 2009 
3.3.2 Projection of American Oil Consumption 
 Reductions in oil consumption are expected in other sectors of the American 
economy as well.  The use of oil in the generation of electricity will decline over time 
as overall electricity demand is expected to grow slowly.  Electricity generation from 
existing oil-fired plants will be offset by the growth in electricity generation from new 
plants using coal, natural gas, nuclear and renewable fuels while little new oil-fired 
capacity will be installed.  Oil will be increasingly displaced as a fuel for heating 
buildings and will be used in lower quantities in industry as energy efficiencies 
improve.  The conclusion to be drawn is that the EISA and EIEA will have a 
considerable impact on American oil consumption; total consumption in 2030 will be 
less than or equal to 2008 levels [IEA World Energy Outlook, 2009, OPEC World Oil 
Outlook, 2009, EIA Annual Energy Outlook, 2009], see Figure 32. 
Figure 32: Various American Oil Consumption Projections to 2030 
 
Sources: IEA World Energy Outlook, 2009, OPEC World Oil Outlook, 2009, EIA Annual Energy Outlook, 200914 
 
                                                          
14
 EIA figures include oil products such as lubricants, waxes, asphalt, special naphthas and miscellaneous 
petroleum products 
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3.3.3 Projection of American Oil Production 
 Declining future oil consumption is but one of the factors that will serve to 
improve American oil security. Another important variable is the ability of domestic oil 
production to expand and its capacity to meet demand.  As shown earlier in this 
chapter, American oil consumption rapidly increased through the latter half of the 20
th
 
century despite declining domestic oil production.  Oil production was seen to have 
peaked in 1970 at a level of 9.637 Mb/d and has steadily declined until production 
reached approximately 4.95 Mb/d in 2008.  The declining trend in Figure 3 is clear and 
it would be logical to assume that future production will continue to decline at a similar 
rate to the past several decades.  Future production, however, will see a reverse in the 
trend as future production will remain flat with the possibility that it may even increase.  
OPEC for example, believes American oil production will remain flat until the year 
2016 as new deepwater production from of the Gulf of Mexico comes on-line.  This 
production is projected to offset the decline from the oil fields in Texas, California, 
Alaska and the shallower Gulf of Mexico fields [OPEC World Oil Outlook, 2009].  
After 2016 OPEC believes that production will again continue its historical decline and 
by 2030 oil production will be 1 Mb/d lower than in 2016.   This is seen as a 
conservative estimation, the OPEC projection does not take into account potential 
production from the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), offshore fields in the Atlantic, 
Pacific and Gulf of Mexico which had been under federal exploration bans until 2008.  
Further production gains will be realized through the application of new Enhanced Oil 
Recovery (EOR) technologies which will increase recovery from both new and old oil 
fields. 
Offshore oil production has faced stiff resistance since the 1960s.  Oil 
production off the coast of southern California was set to take off towards the end of 
the decade when disaster struck in 1969: due to a geological anomaly 6000 barrels of 
crude oil leaked into the sea and washed up on California beaches [Yergin, 1991].  This 
environmental disaster created a nationwide outcry against offshore drilling and forced 
President Richard Nixon to place a moratorium on drilling of the California coast 
[Yergin, 1991].  Since 1982 Congressional and Executive bans on offshore drilling 
have been extended to the OCS.  From that year up until 2008 Congress annually 
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enacted appropriation riders which prohibited the exploration and production of oil and 
natural gas on most of the OCS.  In 1990 President George H.W. Bush further 
supported this action of Congress by signing an executive ban that prohibited leasing on 
the OCS in the Atlantic and Pacific coasts as well as in parts of the Eastern and Central 
Gulf of Mexico.  The executive ban was then extended until 2012 by President William 
Clinton [EIA Annual Energy Outlook, 2009].  All of the obstacles to exploration and 
production in the OCS, however, were removed in 2008 when Congress allowed the 
congressional ban to expire and when President George W. Bush lifted the executive 
ban 4 years before it was set to expire.  Lifting the executive ban makes blocks in the 
Atlantic and Pacific OCS available for leasing of 2010 with parts of the Eastern and 
Central Gulf of Mexico available for leasing in 2022.  This is an important development 
for the American oil industry because the areas previously under the ban are believed to 
contain vast amounts of oil and natural gas deposits that would enable domestic oil 
production to increase for the first time since 1970.  The total technically recoverable 
resources in the OCS are estimated at 93.31 billion barrels of oil (see Figure 33), an 
amount more than 4 times as large as the remaining US proven oil reserves
15
 [EIA 
Annual Energy Outlook, 2009].  Proven resources may end up being less than the 93 
billion barrels however many geologists are quite certain that these areas will prove to 
be fruitful in the coming years. 
Although the barriers to exploration and production in the Atlantic and Pacific 
have been removed it will take several years before oil production from these areas is 
realized.  Well before production starts block leases must be bid on by oil companies 
and awarded by the Minerals Management Service (MMS) of the U.S. Department of 
the Interior, a process that can take up to a year or two.   From there the companies 
that were awarded blocks must present detailed exploration and development plans for 
approval from the MMS before starting exploratory drilling.  Exploratory drilling can 
take anywhere from 1-3 years for a project in shallower waters to up to 6 years in deep 
water [EIA Annual Energy Outlook, 2009].  A further 1-3 years is then required for 
development drilling which means that the whole process, from bidding on blocks 
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 EIA estimates proven American oil reserves in 2009 equaled 21.317 billion barrels [EIA Petroleum 
Naviagator] 
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Figure 33: Outer Continental Shelf Technically Recoverable Resources, January 1, 2007 
 
Source: EIA Annual Energy Outlook, 2009 
to production can be expected to take from 4-12 years.  Therefore leases which are 
awarded in 2010 can be expected to come on-line anywhere from 2014 in the best case 
scenario to 2022 for deepwater projects.  These factors have been included in the EIA‟s 
projection of U.S. oil production which is believed to start increasing in 2009 and 
continue to do so until 2030, see Figures 34 and 35 below.  The reference case scenario 
does come across as quite optimistic, however.  Offshore oil drilling will continue to 
face vocal opposition from environmental groups and has been a delicate subject in 
American domestic politics.  If there happens to be an oil spill any time over the next 
20 years, be it in the United States or anywhere else on the globe, it would give 
opponents of offshore drilling the perfect pretext to halt further development.  
Accordingly, it seems more prudent to use the numbers for the OCS limited scenario to 
prepare for the future.  Under the OCS scenario American domestic production rises to 
6.21 Mb/d in 2020 and modestly increases to 6.83 Mb/d.   
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Figure 34: Projected total domestic oil production  Figure 35: Figures of projected  
in the United States  up to 2030 (Mb/d) domestic crude oil production in 2020 
and 2030 
  
Source: EIA Annual Energy Outlook, 2009   Source: EIA Annual Energy Outlook, 2009 
 
 The implications for American oil security from increasing domestic production 
are significant.  With consumption decreasing and production slightly increasing, fewer 
imports will be required over the projected period.  In 2020 the United States will need 
to import roughly 9.05 Mb/d of crude oil and other oil products
16
, a number that drops 
to 8.39 Mb/d in 2025 before a slight climb to 8.49 Mb/d in 2030, see Figure 36.  If 
these trends hold true by 2030 the United States will be importing almost 4.5 Mb/d less 
than in 2008.  Oil security will be further enhanced by the fact that over this same 
period of time Canada will be producing substantially more oil than at present enabling 
exports to rise.   
  Canadian production of oil will increase by almost 2 Mb/d between 2008 
and 2030.  Unlike with the conventional sources of crude oil found in the Middle East, 
expanding production in Canada is a far more difficult proposition. Out of the 178 
billion barrels of proven oil reserves in Canada, 173 billion barrels are trapped in the oil 
sands of Alberta.  Oil from the oil sands is much more difficult to extract, requiring 
large inputs of water and natural gas in order to produce a usable commodity.  The oil 
sands also face opposition from groups who fear rapid expansion of oil production will 
lead to serious environmental and human rights problems (see Chapter 4 for greater 
detail of the Canadian oil industry).  Production expansion will therefore be slower than 
is possible in conventional oil fields.  Nonetheless, oil production will increase from 2.6 
                                                          
16
 Other products include: Gross Refined Products, Unfinished Oil, and Blending components. [EIA 
International Energy Outlook 2009] 
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Mb/d in 2008 to over 5 Mb/d by 2030 [EIA International Energy Outlook, 2009, OPEC 
World Oil Outlook 2009].  With Canadian oil consumption not projected to increase 
over this time, Canada will have the capacity to increase oil exports to the United States 
Figure 36: Estimated Future U.S. Import Requirements (Mb/d) 
 
Source: EIA Annual Energy Outlook, 2009 
 
from 1.956 Mb/d to nearly 4 Mb/d between 2008 and 2030.  Factoring in refined oil 
products, Canadian exports may exceed 4 Mb/d in which case Canada would be 
supplying the United States with more than 45% of its oil imports.  In such a scenario 
American oil supply security is much improved.  Canada is ranked as the most secure 
oil producing country in the world according to the Energy Security Index because of a 
lack of government interference in the energy industry and its ability to safely transport 
oil.  Oil is transported to American refineries via pipelines which are much more secure 
than shipping oil by tankers.  Oil tankers have recently become targeted by pirates in 
the Gulf of Aden and can also be affected by adverse weather conditions.  Geopolitics 
can also affect oil shipments by sea.  A case in point is the Strait of Hormuz where 40% 
of world‟s oil must pass through [DeBard, 2009].  Iran controls this strait and could 
choose to close this strait for any number of reasons.  For the United States this would 
cut off their imports from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates 
whose combined supply to the U.S. amount to 2.37 Mb/d in 2008 [EIA Petroleum 
Navigator].  The United States would not need to struggle in a battle versus China and 
India to secure oil supplies agreements from unstable regimes.  Furthermore, increasing 
oil imports from Canada the United States will be able to improve its profile 
internationally.  While not yet energy independent, America‟s position in 2030 will be 
much better than it has been since the first half of the 20
th
 century. 
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CHAPTER 4: CANADA AND THE OIL SANDS 
 
 With the second largest land mass of any nation in the world Canada has been 
endowed with vast amounts of natural resources which it has utilized to become one of 
the largest energy producers in the world.  Canada is the world‟s third largest producer 
and second largest exporter of natural gas, the sixth largest producer of electricity, and 
the seventh largest oil producer [CIA World Factbook: Canada].  With the second 
largest oil reserves in the world, Canada is poised to become a more prolific producer 
of oil and petroleum products over the next 20 years.  Compared to other oil exporting 
countries Canada‟s oil industry is still in its infancy due to the complexities involved in 
producing crude oil from the oil sands of Western Canada.  Despite these difficulties 
Canada has already surpassed Saudi Arabia as the largest supplier of foreign oil to the 
United States.  Further technological improvements and more investment are needed 
for Canada to expand production over the next couple of decades in order to supply and 
even larger percentage of American oil needs.  With a stable, democratic government 
and strong economy, Canada presents international oil companies with an ideal 
investment climate.  This development will further deepen the economic and political 
ties between the North American neighbours and the United States will use greater 
volumes of Canadian oil to strengthen its oil supply security.  Global oil reserves will 
decline over the next couple of decades and oil production will become increasingly 
concentrated in fewer countries, this will exacerbate oil supply security issues for oil 
importing nations.  Due to the nature of its oil reserves, producing crude oil in Canada 
presents greater challenges than in the traditional oil regions of the world.  Producing 
oil in Canada is more costly in both monetary and in environmental terms and 
opposition to expansion of oil sands projects has been steadily growing.  Canada, 
however, will overcome these challenges and see its oil production expand substantially 
over the next 20 years and further consolidate its position as the largest oil supplier to 
the United States. 
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4.1 Canadian Oil Reserves: 
Large scale oil production first began in the mid-19
th
 century in the American 
state of Pennsylvania.  American oil production dominated until the epicentre of the 
global oil industry shifted to the Middle East in the mid-20
th
 century with the discovery 
of the enormous oil fields of Burgan and Ghawar in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, 
respectively.  New oil discoveries which increased American oil reserves from 21 
billion barrels to 38 billion barrels between 1948 and 1972, American reserves as a 
percentage of total global reserves fell from 34% to 7% during that time period [Yergin, 
1991]. The reason for this drop was the increase of proven Middle Eastern oil reserves 
grew from 28 billion barrels to 367 billion barrels.  The reported reserves in the Middle 
East continued to grow and in 2002 the top five countries with the largest reserves were 
from the Middle East, see Table 2.  Total Middle Eastern reserves were estimated to be 
685.59 billion barrels, a staggering 66% of total world oil reserves. [EIA International 
Energy Statistics]  At the end of that same year, however, a simple change transformed 
Canada from a fringe player in the world oil market to the country with the second 
largest oil reserves in the world.  In 2002 Canada‟s reserves, as estimated by the Oil 
and Gas Journal, were 4.9 billion barrels.  At the end of the year the Oil and Gas 
Journal changed its methodology and as a result the oil sands were no longer classified 
as “unconventional oil”.  This change in methodology increased Canada‟s oil reserves 
from 4.9 billion barrels to 180 billion barrels overnight and in the process it cut OPEC‟s 
share of world oil reserves by 10% [McColl, 2008].  Most other reserve estimates 
followed suit and since 2003 Canada has been listed as the country with the largest 
reserves behind Saudi Arabia (see Table 3).     
Table 2: Oil Reserve Estimates, 2002        Table 3: Oil Reserve Estimates, 2003 
   
             Source: EIA International Energy Statistics      Source: EIA International Energy Statistics 
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There are three predominant oil producing regions in Canada; the Western 
Canada Sedimentary Basin (WCSB)
17
, offshore of Newfoundland and Labrador, and 
the oil sands in Alberta.  Canada‟s oil reserves are spread unevenly among the three 
regions with the oil sands in Alberta containing the vast majority of total reserves.  
Offshore reserves are currently estimated to be 1.02 billion barrels, while the WCSB is 
estimated to contain another 2.85 billion barrels [NEB 2009 reference case scenario].  It 
is possible that future discoveries in these regions will be made but it is not believed 
that a giant oil field will be found.  Large oil reserves, estimated at 90 billion barrels 
[USGS Circum Arctic Appraisal], are thought to exist within the Arctic Circle.  These 
reserves, however, are not yet accessible due to environmental conditions.  
Furthermore, jurisdiction over Arctic resources is being contested by several nations 
including Canada, Russia, Norway, Denmark and the United States.  Even without this 
potential new source of oil, Canada has enormous proved reserves in the oil sands.  
Located near the town of Fort McMurry, Alberta the oil sands contain approximately 
173 billion barrels, or 96% of total Canadian oil reserves.  With reserve estimates 
constantly being revised due to technological advances, the market price of crude oil, 
and political factors, it is difficult to know what the ultimately recoverable amount of 
oil will be.  Some estimates have put the number of ultimately recoverable crude oil 
from the oil sands at around 315 billion barrels [NEB Canada‟s Oil Sands, 2006].  
Although it took many years for production from the oil sands to reach commercial 
levels, production from the WCSB and offshore have already matured and thus any 
future increases in Canadian oil production will come solely from the oil sands. 
The Oil & Gas Journal changed their methodology in 2002 to include oil sands 
as a “conventional” source of oil, however oil sands are among the sources of crude oil 
that are still often referred to as “unconventional”.  It is difficult to make a clear 
distinction between what constitutes a “conventional” source and an “unconventional” 
source since there does not exist any single accepted definition of these terms.  Often 
the criterion for conventional crude oil is done in terms of viscosity; the Association for 
the Study of Peak Oil and Gas (ASPO), for example, classify oil with a viscosity above 
                                                          
17
 The WCSB lies under the provinces of Alberta, British Colombia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and the 
Northwest Territories  
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17⁰API as being conventional [EWG, 2007].  Sometimes a more pragmatic definition is 
also used whereby conventional oil includes crude oil with a viscosity greater than 
17⁰API, heavy oil with a viscosity between 10-17⁰API, all deep sea oil, polar oil and 
condensate.  Even this definition is too restrictive since it requires that a source of oil 
fall into one of those categories in order to be labelled “conventional”.  Whether or not 
a source of oil is conventional is geological terms is irrelevant and the “exclusion of 
developed commercial, non-conventional oil from reserves, because of the quality or 
method of extraction...seems rather illogical” [Haider, 2000].  It is most reasonable, 
therefore, to accept the economic definition of conventional oil: “oil which can be 
produced with current technologies under present economic conditions” [EWG, 2007].  
Oil sands are referred to as unconventional because unlike the sweet light crude oil 
which bursts out of the ground in the Middle East, the oil sands consist of a thick, 
naturally occurring mixture of sand, minerals, water and bitumen.  Bitumen is a “heavy, 
viscous oil that must be processed extensively to convert it into a crude oil before it can 
be used by refineries to produce gasoline and other petroleum products” [CAPP, 2009].  
At room temperature bitumen has the consistency of molasses and needs to be diluted 
with a light hydrocarbon liquid in order to transport it through pipelines, see Annex 4 
for a picture of unprocessed oil sand.  Regardless of classification, production from the 
oil sands contributed to Canada becoming the seventh largest producer of oil and will 
be the source of future production growth. 
4.2 Current Production, Consumption and Exports of Canadian Oil 
 Oil production in Canada has grown more than twofold in the past 30 years.  
Total Canadian oil production
18
 increased at the steady rate of 2.5%, from 1.662 Mb/d 
in 1981 to over 3.35 Mb/d in 2008, see Figure 37 [EIA International Energy Statistics].  
This current rate of production places Canada as the seventh largest oil producer in the 
world, producing 3.9% of the total output of world oil (see Table 4).  The WCSB has 
traditionally been the source for the majority of Canadian oil production however most 
of the fields in the WCSB are now mature and starting to decline in production.  In 
1999 65% of Canadian production came from the WCSB, a Figure that has since fallen 
                                                          
18
 The production of crude oil including lease condensate, natural gas plant liquids, and other liquids, 
and refinery processing gain 
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to 39% as bitumen production from the oil sands started to replace the conventional 
supply [EIA Country Analysis Briefs: Canada].  Production from fields offshore 
Newfoundland and Labrador totalled approximately 368,000 barrels per day in 2008, 
however these fields are also thought to be in decline [EIA Country Analysis Briefs: 
Canada].  This region is still being explored for additional oil reserves and Atlantic oil 
production is expected to be given a boost when heavy oil production from the Hebron 
field comes on-line in 2017 [CAPP, 2009].  Despite this potential boost from the 
Hebron field, the offshore and WCSB regions are in terminal decline and do not offer 
any prospects for expanding future oil production. 
Unlike the other oil producing regions the oil sands are far from maturing and 
the growth of output can only be constrained by a lack of investment.  The 
technological challenges of separating bitumen from the oil sands mixture prevented 
commercial production until 1967.  The first oil sands operation was undertaken by the 
Great Canadian Oil Sands ltd and it took them until the year 2000 to reach a production  
Figure 37: Canadian Oil Production 1980-2008   Table 4: Top Oil Producing 
                   (thousand barrels per day)    Countries (Million tons, Mt) 
   
                Source: EIA International Energy Statistics  Source: IEA Key World Energy Statistics 2009 
 
level of 600,000 barrels per day [CERA Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands, 2009].  
Production has dramatically increased since the year 2000 as extraction techniques 
improved and investments increased.  In 2009 1.3 Mb/d were produced from the oil 
sands, more than double the 2000 level [CERA Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands, 
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2009].  One of the technological advances in extraction that enabled production to 
increase is in situ
19
 production (see section 4.3 for details of in situ extraction).  When 
commercial production from oil sands first began, bitumen was extracted using open-
pit mining, a method still responsible for 55% of the total oil sands output [CERA 
Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands, 2009].  The largest oil sands projects remain the 
mining operations, like the Canadian Oil Sands ltd Syncrude Project which produced 
290,000 bb/d in 2008, and the Suncor mine which produced 228,000 bb/d in the same 
year [EIA Country Analysis Briefs: Canada].  The in situ projects outnumber mining 
operations but they are smaller in scale.  The largest of the in situ projects is the Cold 
Lake facility which is operated by Imperial Oil (a subsidiary of ExxonMobil) and has a 
production capacity of 150,000 bb/d.  Although the in situ projects are currently smaller 
in scale large expansions are foreseen.  Open-pit mining is very limited because only 
20% of the oil sands are shallow enough to be mined with the remaining bitumen only 
accessible by using in situ technology. 
As Canada‟s oil production increased over the past decade so did its exports.  
From 1984 to 2008 Canadian crude oil exports increased more than fivefold, from 
277,000 b/d to 1.55 Mb/d (see Figure 38).  Canada‟s refining capacity also enables 
Canada to export many other petroleum products such as gasoline and petrochemicals.  
The United States is the most logical export market for Canadian oil due to 
geographical proximity and the existence of a large network of pipelines and presently 
receives 99% of all Canadian oil exports [EIA Country Analysis Briefs: Canada].  The 
United States is linked to Canada‟s oil industry through six export pipelines: the 
Enbridge, Kinder Morgan Express, Kinder Morgan Transmountain, Milk River, and 
Rangeland pipelines.  These pipelines have a total capacity of 2.6 Mb/d [McColl, 2008] 
and are being used near this maximum rate.   Exports grew over the past decade to the 
point where Canada is now the largest foreign supplier of oil to the US providing 19% 
of total petroleum imports at a rate of 2.46 Mb/d in 2008 [CERA Growth in the 
Canadian Oil Sands], see Table 5.  Oil exports to the United States are not spread 
equally among the 50 states and vary greatly between the five so-called Petroleum 
Administration for Defence Districts (PADD).  The continental United States was 
                                                          
19
 In situ: Latin phrase meaning “in place”   
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divided into five PADDs during the Second World War to better organize fuel rationing 
throughout the country and this delineation is still used in the American oil industry 
today  [CAPP, 2009].  The majority of Canadian oil exports are sent to PADD II, the 
region south-east of the oil sands which is linked to Alberta through several pipelines 
including the Enbridge Spearhead and MinnCan pipelines [CAPP, 2009].  Of the 2.436 
Mb/d produced in Western Canada in 2008, 47.4% was shipped to PADD II (see Annex 
4 for a detailed map of oil exports to each PADD [CAPP, 2009].  None of the other 
PADD regions are currently receiving large quantities of oil from western Canada, but 
this is a situation which will change in the future as oil sands production and exports 
continue to rise.   
The large volume of oil exports to the United States would suggest Canada is 
solely an exporter.  The eastern provinces of Canada, however, import a sizeable 
volume of oil from Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom.  This is because the 
provinces east of Ontario are not connected via pipeline to the oil fields in Alberta.  
Over the same period of time that Canadian oil exports 
Figure 38: Canadian Exports of Crude Oil 1984-2008 (thousand barrels per day) 
 
Source: EIA International Energy Statistics 
Table 5: Top Sources of American Oil Imports Figure 38: 
 
Source: CERA Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands, 2009 
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were increasing, as shown in Figure 37, so too were Canadian crude oil imports.  Crude 
oil imports steadily increased from 244,780 b/d to 920,000 b/d between 1984 and 2001 
before levelling off (see Figure 39).  In 2008 Canadian crude oil imports totalled 
847,000 b/d [EIA International Energy Statistics].  Taking imports of crude oil and 
other petroleum products into account Canada remains a net exporter of oil (see Figure 
40).  The Eastern provinces seem set to remain oil importers into the foreseeable future 
as production from the Atlantic fields decline however western crude oil may begin to 
flow into Quebec if Montreal-to-Sarnia pipeline is reversed [CAPP, 2009].   
Figure 39: Canadian Crude Oil Imports  Figure 40: Canadian Net Export of Oil  
                   (thousand barrels per day)         1994-2008 (Mb/d) 
  
             Source: EIA International Energy Statistics   Source: EIA International Energy Statistics 
4.3 Oil Sands Production Techniques 
 The Canadian oil sands have been recognized as a potential source of 
recoverable crude oil since before the 20
th
 century.  Geologist Robert Bell first 
speculated that huge oil deposits may exist in the Alberta oil sands in 1884, what was 
not immediately clear was how to separate the bitumen from the sand, clay and other 
impurities.  Dr. Karl Clark, a chemist working for the Alberta Research Council, was 
the first person to develop a method to isolate bitumen by saturating the oil sands with 
hot water, steam and caustic soda in a rotating drum [CERA Growth in the Canadian 
Oil Sands, 2009].  Dr. Clark‟s breakthrough method occurred in 1920 but it would take 
several more decades before the method was sufficiently refined in order to make it 
commercially viable.  Commercial production eventually began when the Great 
Canadian Oil Sands ltd opened the first open-pit mining project in 1967.   
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Unlike most sources of conventional oil which lie underground and can only be 
accessed through drilling, the oil sands are relatively shallow and significant volumes 
of oil can be collected through open-pit mines.  This method, similar to traditional 
forms of open-pit mining, begins by clearing the overburden; the grass, trees and other 
vegetation which lie on the surface.  Once the overburden has been removed, large 
mechanical shovels dump the raw oil sand onto massive 400-ton trucks which then 
transport the oil sands to a facility where the bitumen is separated from water, clay, 
sand and other minerals.  The separated bitumen is then sent to an upgrader, a facility 
where bitumen is refined into a usable product or is diluted for transportation by 
pipeline.  The process is quite laborious as it takes approximately 2 metric tons of 
mined oil sands to produce 1 barrel of oil [CERA Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands, 
2009].  Nonetheless this method still accounts for 55% of the 1.3 Mb/d which were 
extracted from the oil sands in 2008 [CERA Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands, 2009]. 
 New extraction technologies were required in order to reach the 80% of 
recoverable oil sands not accessible through open-pit mines.  The solution was to inject 
steam directly into the ground making the bitumen less viscous so that it can be pumped 
to the surface.  Two similar methods are used: Cyclic Steam Stimulation (CSS) and 
Steam Assisted Gravity Drainage (SAGD).  Initially developed in the 1950s, CSS 
technology was commercialized by 1985 [McColl, 2008].  The extraction process takes 
place in several stages.  The first stage involves injecting steam into the ground at a 
temperature of 300⁰C and at a pressure averaging 11,000 kilopascals for several weeks 
[McColl, 2008].  The steam injection is then stopped and the bitumen is pumped to the 
surface until the ground temperature falls to a lower boundary where extraction rates 
decline; at this point the process is re-started with the steam injection [North Peace 
Energy].  SAGD is a more recent technology.  It was developed during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s and is a more continual process than CSS [McColl, 2008].  SAGD 
involves drilling two horizontal pipes 200m under the ground, one pipe above the other.  
The upper pipe injects steam into the ground and as the bitumen softens it trickles down 
to the second pipe which pumps it to the surface for processing. (See Annex 4 for 
diagrams of each method)  In situ methods have several advantages over open-pit 
mining.  Many pipes can be drilled into the ground under the same facility thus 
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disturbing less of the ground surface.  Additionally, recovering the bitumen using either 
SAGD or CSS does not require the construction of tailings ponds, an environmentally 
hazardous by-product of the separating facilities in mining operations (for details see 
section 4.4.2).  The two methods generated approximately the same output of 200,000 
barrels per day in 2007 [CERA Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands, 2009], however 
SAGD is projected to provide more of the oil supply growth in the future due to a 
number of advantages over CSS [NEB Canada‟s Oil Sands, 2006].  One advantage with 
SAGD is that it is a much more efficient process with a recovery factor of 50% 
compared to the 15-20% for a CSS operation [McColl, 2008].  The most important 
advantage though, as is often the case, is a lower production cost.  SAGD requires a 
lower steam-to-oil ratio
20
 which enables it to not only lower water requirements but 
also to produce bitumen at a lower cost than CSS.  Supply costs for SADG are 
estimated to be in the range of $18-$22 per barrel with capital spending requirements of 
$15,000 per barrel compared to a supply cost of $20-$24 for CSS and capital spending 
requirements of $20,000 per barrel   [NEB Canada‟s Oil Sands, 2006], see Table 6 and 
7.  Due to these advantages production from SAGD in 2008 was slightly higher than 
from CSS [CERA Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands, 2009] and most new in situ 
projects will use SAGD technology [Humphries, 2007].  Research is being conducted 
on enhanced SAGD technology which will further lower costs, water requirements and 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.      
Table 6: 
 
Source: NEB Canada‟s Oil Sands, 2006 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 Steam-to-Oil ratio is “the ratio of the volume of steam injected to the volume of bitumen recovered” 
[McColl, 2008] 
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Table 7: 
 
Source: NEB Canada‟s Oil Sands, 2006 
4.4 Environmental Concerns 
 The production of oil has never been considered to be an environmentally 
friendly industry.  The oil sands, however, pose an even greater challenge to 
environmental sustainability.  The oil sands are located in an area of Canada‟s 
expansive boreal forest covering 1.3 billion acres of land which contains vast wetlands 
filled with wildlife.  This northern area of the province of Alberta, hundreds of 
kilometres from the nearest city, had long been untouched.  The recent Canadian oil 
boom, encouraged by the high price of oil between 2007 and 2009, has altered the 
landscape as more land leases have been signed and new production facilities have 
come into operation.  Principle environmental concerns include: the disturbance of the 
ground surface, the formation of tailings ponds, fresh water management, and GHG 
emissions.  Environmental issues are among the greatest challenges which need to be 
addressed for oil sands production to expand.  The oil industry risks provoking public 
opposition to expansion of oil sands production should their environmental record be 
less than acceptable.  The American oil industry has witnessed the power of public 
opposition: Atlantic, Pacific and Central Gulf of Mexico offshore oil drilling was 
prohibited until the year 2008 due to Congressional and Legislative bans following an 
offshore oil leak in 1969 [Yergin,1991].  Lowering GHG emissions will be particularly 
crucial for the oil industry as Canada sets new environmental targets following the UN 
climate summit of 2009 in Copenhagen.  Lowering the carbon footprint of bitumen 
production will also be necessary in order to continue oil exports to the United States as 
American environmental regulations become stricter.  The positive investment climate 
in Canada along with Federal research subsidies has encouraged technological progress 
to improve the environmental impact from oil sands production.   Technological 
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advances are showing promises in cutting the use of fresh water and lowering GHG 
emissions while land reclamation projects have demonstrated that disturbed land can be 
returned to nature.  The Federal government of Canada must continue to work with 
industry and environmental groups to further these advances and apply them in 
commercial production.   
4.4.1 Land Disturbance 
Both the mining and in situ operations have their environmental shortcomings 
however the mining operations are particularly destructive to the physical environment.  
In their application to expand the Muskeg River Mine, Shell Canada Energy states that 
the expansion will result in “a complete loss of soil and terrain, terrestrial vegetation, 
wetlands and forest resources, wildlife and biodiversity” during the life of the mine 
[CERA Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands, 2009].  Removal of the overburden is an 
unfortunate but necessary requirement to reach the oil sands via open-pit mining.  
Currently 518 square kilometres of land [CERA Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands, 
2009] are disturbed by the open-pit mines with this number certain to grow over the 
next several years.  Imperial Oil‟s Kearn mine and Petro-Canada‟s Fort Hills mine are 
but two of the proposed projects expected to come online over the next decade and 
while they will combine to add 400,000 b/d of output [CERA Growth in the Canadian 
Oil Sands, 2009], they will also add to the ecological damage of the area.  The nature of 
open-pit mines is such that during the lifespan of the mine little can be done to make 
the process more environmentally sound.  In comparison, in situ facilities are better 
than the mining operations affecting about 15% of the land disturbed by mining while 
not producing tailings ponds [Government of Alberta, 2006].  In situ facilities, 
however, require an extensive network of pipes which break-up parts of the forest 
taking away much of the natural habitat from indigenous animals.  In order to restore 
the natural environment as quickly as possible, the Government of Alberta requires all 
applications for oil sands operations to include full plans for land reclamation.  To 
ensure compliance the company in charge of a project is obligated by law to post a 
“financial security equivalent to the cost of reclamation before beginning oil sands 
activity” [Government of Alberta, 2006].  These funds, totalling $721 million in 2008, 
are returned to the firm once a land reclamation certificate has been issued by the 
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Government of Alberta.  In spite of the financial security, the pace of land reclamation 
has been slow with only 1 square kilometre of land certified as being reclaimed [CERA 
Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands, 2009] with a further 65 square kilometres of land in 
the process of being reclaimed [Government of Alberta, 2006].  It is estimated that by 
2020 a third of all disturbed land will be reclaimed and this projection, in addition to 
the current figures, are as per the reclamation plans agreed to between government and 
industry when the projects were originally approved.  [CERA Growth in the Canadian 
Oil Sands, 2009]  Sadly the pace of reclamation is constrained by the long lifespan of 
mines, some of which have been in operation for over 30 years, and the length of time it 
takes for land to be reclaimed, estimated at 50 years in some cases [Government of 
Alberta, 2006].  The process of complete land reclamation will take a very long time 
and environmental groups, along with Federal and Provincials Governments, will need 
to constantly monitor reclamation efforts to ensure nature is restored as soon as 
possible. 
4.4.2 Tailings Ponds 
 A further blemish on the Alberta landscape comes from the tailings ponds 
which contain the waste water from the extraction process.  These ponds contain water, 
sand, clay and other wastes 
21
 which are left to sit in unlined open-air basins.  The waste 
water is pumped into the basin and settles into three separate layers.  The bottom layer 
is composed of the sand, which quickly settles at the bottom of the pond and acts as a 
lining to prevent run-off from reaching the river or contaminating ground-water.  The 
middle layer is a mixture of clay, water and silt while the top layer is comprised of 
water and left over bitumen.   The management of the ponds has become a more 
important issue as mining operations have grown; in addition to the 518 square 
kilometres of land disturbed by the mines themselves, another 140 square kilometres of 
land is occupied by tailings ponds [CERA Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands, 2009].  
The ponds received national notoriety in the spring of 2008 when a group of 500 
migrating ducks landed in Syncrude‟s Aurora mine tailing pond, which resulted in 
almost all of them being killed [Brooymans, 2008].  This incident renewed debate over 
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 Other residues include benzene, phenols, toluene, ammonia, arsenic, cyanide and iron [CERA] 
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the environmental impact of oil sands operations; it should be noted, however, that 
environmental regulations are improving.  In addition to installing noisemakers to 
scare-off birds, tailings ponds are required to include groundwater monitoring and 
seepage capture facilities as well as building interceptor ditches to prevent seepage 
from entering rivers [Government of Alberta, 2006].  In 2008, the Government of 
Alberta provided $7 million in grants to study the reclamation of tailings ponds 
[Government of Alberta, 2006] and the National Research Council of Canada (NRC) is 
researching methods to recover residual bitumen and metals such as aluminum and 
titanium [Humphries, 2007].  Additionally, the Energy Resources Conservation Board 
(ERCB), responsible for regulating Alberta‟s energy development, set a new directive 
whereby after July 2012 half of all the clay accumulated in the tailings pond must be 
removed and solidified to the point that it could support heavy equipment traffic. 
[CERA Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands, 2009]  These developments prove that the 
government is trying to prevent environmental damage and is taking the management 
of tailings ponds seriously.  While the publicity surrounding the tailings ponds has been 
negative, they also play an important role in water conservation, as will be described in 
the next section. 
4.4.3 Water Management 
Oil sands operations, in particular from mining, are extremely water intensive 
and people are concerned that increased oil sands production will place too great a 
strain on the Athabasca river.  In order to produce one barrel of bitumen from mined oil 
sands, it is estimated that 12 to 14 barrels of water are needed [CERA Growth in the 
Canadian Oil Sands, 2009], all of which is then pumped into the tailings ponds.  Water 
from the tailings ponds is then reused in the separation process, reducing the need to 
draw freshwater from the Athabasca River.  At present it is not possible to recycle 
100% of the water from the tailings ponds.  Out of the 12-14 barrels of water used to 
produce a barrel of bitumen, 8 to 10 barrels of water are recycled from the ponds with 
approximately 4 barrels of water stuck in the middle layer of the pond [CERA Growth 
in the Canadian Oil Sands, 2009].  The water that cannot be recycled must be drawn 
from the river, resulting in a net use of 4 barrels of fresh water for every barrel of 
bitumen.  In situ production facilities require much less fresh water per barrel.  Up to 
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95% of the water used to produce steam in SAGD operations is reused resulting in 1.3 
barrels of additional water needed to produce 6.3 barrels of bitumen [NEB Canada‟s oil 
sands, 2006].  The total amount of fresh water which companies are allowed to remove 
from the Athabasca River fluctuates according to the flow of the river, during periods 
of low flow consumption is restricted to 1.3% of annual river flow [Government of 
Alberta, 2006].  This limit has not been a constraint on the oil companies who are 
currently consuming less water from the river than is currently allowed.  The 
Government has approved companies to use a maximum of the 350 million cubic 
meters of water while present consumption amounts to 150 million cubic meters 
[Humphries, 2007].  Therefore, it appears that water consumption in oil sands 
production is sustainable and will not limit further production expansion.  Furthermore, 
technological advances under development promise to drastically cut the use of water.  
Steam Assisted Gas Push (SAGP) is a new technology that is similar to SAGD except 
that it mixes non-condensable gas with the steam.  This process is estimated to reduce 
steam consumption by 70% compared to SAGD [McColl, 2008].  Yet another new 
technique currently being researched is Solvent-Based Recovery Processes (VAPEX) 
which plan to recover bitumen using gaseous solvents thus eliminating the use of water 
and also potentially reducing GHG emissions by 85% [McColl, 2008].  The ability of 
industry to reduce water consumption in the face of government controls builds 
confidence that similar improvements can be made with other environmental issues, 
particularly with respect to the emission of Greenhouse Gases. 
4.4.4 Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions are among the most contentious 
environmental issues in Canada with emissions from oil sands production of particular 
concern.  A poll conducted by the Environmental Monitor in 2007 showed that global 
warming was the top environmental concern of Canadians [McAllister Opinion 
Research, 2007]. A clear majority, 62% of respondents, favoured stricter regulations for 
the oil and gas industry.   These concerns are justified since Canada is among the 
world‟s ten largest emitters with total CO2 emissions of 544,680 thousand metric tons in 
2006 [UN Millennium Development Goals Indicators].  Although at this level Canadian 
emissions account for only 2% of total world emissions, far below countries such as 
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China, the United States, Russia and India (see Table 8), the numbers become far less 
complimentary when adjusted for population.  As shown in Figure 41, Canada is behind 
only the United States in emissions per capita.  A portion of emissions is undoubtedly a 
by-product from oil sands production, though not as significant as many Canadians 
believe.  Oil sands production account for 5% of Canadian GHG emissions, 1/8
th
 the 
level of emissions from the transportation sector, 1/4
th
 from electricity and heat 
generation and half of the emissions from agriculture [Government of Alberta, 2006].  
In response to public worries the industry has been researching new methods to reduce 
GHG intensity levels so that oil sands production will be viewed more favourably. 
Table 8: Largest emitters of Carbon Dioxide (CO2) 
 
Source: UN Millennium Development Goals Indicators 
 
Figure 41: CO2 emissions per capita 
 
Source: Mourougane, 2008 
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 Oil production from the oil sands currently emits more carbon dioxide when 
compared to conventional oil production.  Comparing well-to-retail pump
22
 emissions 
from various oil sources shows that mined oil sands emit 1.3 times as much carbon 
dioxide as the average barrel of oil consumed in the United States while emissions from 
oil produced using SAGD are 1.7 times greater [CERA Growth in the Canadian Oil 
Sands, 2009].  For a comparison of emissions by oil source see Annex 4.  
Technological innovations promise to improve these emission rates and when 
combined with Carbon Capture Storage (CCS) technology it is believed that emissions 
from the production of oil sands will be equal or less than that of conventional oil 
[Government of Alberta, 2006].  Developments, such as Solvent Based Recovery 
Processes (VAPEX), have shown the potential to reduce CO2 emissions by 85% 
compared to SAGD [McColl, 2008].  Further improvements to mining, SAGD and CSS 
will lower the amount of emissions per barrel as can be seen in Figure 42, while all new 
oil sands upgraders and in situ facilities that come online during and after 2012 will be 
required to adhere to more stringent CCS targets [Mourougane, 2008].  Despite the 
decrease in emission intensity, overall emissions are still projected to increase as oil 
production increases.  Industry will need to better communicate with the public to show 
its determination to increase efficiencies and lower GHG emissions intensity.  A 2009 
poll commissioned by the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) 
showed that 46% of Canadians think the oil companies have done a poor job balancing 
the environment and the economy [CBCNews, January 2009].  Part of the reason for 
this perception is that the oil industry has not communicated properly with the public, a 
fact acknowledged by the CAPP.  The Federal Government must also be willing to 
force the oil sands industry to continue improving its environmental standards by 
including the oil and gas industry in future GHG reduction efforts.  Environmental 
groups have already been attacking the Conservative Government, led by Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper, for its modest target of reducing GHG emissions in 2020 by 
only 20% from 2006 levels [CBCNews, December 2009].  The Federal government 
risks antagonizing environmental groups and the public by giving special exemptions to 
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 Well-to-retail pump emissions refers to the emissions generated from production, refining and 
transportation of oil 
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oil sands companies.  These exemptions can only serve to reinforce the notion of oil 
sands production as being an extremely polluting industry and move public opinion 
against production expansion.  The Government should set strict, yet achievable, targets 
for oil production in order to prove to its citizens that the oil industry is being held to 
the same pollution reduction standards as other economic sectors.  If there is any good 
news it is that the CAPP poll found that 71% of respondents believed it was possible to 
balance successful development of the oil sands and environmental protection 
[CBCNews, January 2009].  It is now up to industry and the Provincial and Federal 
governments to prove the balance is possible.  Should they be successful then the issue 
of GHG emissions will not constrain increased oil sands development. 
The extraction of bitumen from the oil sands using SAGD or CSS has several 
significant advantages over mining.  The first, and most obvious, advantage is that 80% 
of the oil sands are too far below the surface for open-pit mining.  From an 
environmental standpoint however, in situ oil production is an improvement over 
mining because it has a much smaller footprint on the landscape; in situ processes only 
use approximately 15% of the land which would be disturbed by mines and do not 
produce tailings ponds [Government of Alberta, 2006].  Even in situ processes, 
however, disturb more land compared to conventional oil production.  CERA estimates 
Figure 42: Projected GHG Emissions from Oil Sands 
 
Source: NEB, Canada‟s Oil Sands: Opportunities and Challenges to 2015 an update, 2006 
that a typical SAGD project disturbs 6-7% of the leased land while a conventional 
project may disturb only 4% of the land [CERA Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands, 
2009].  This greater disturbance is due to the fact that SAGD facilities, in order to 
generate sufficient steam and treat water, are larger than conventional facilities.  
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Furthermore SAGD facilities also require a large network of pipes which are often laid 
aboveground.  Some environmentalists also fear that the forest will become 
increasingly fragmented as greater numbers of in situ facilities are built with wildlife 
populations suffering as a result. 
4.5 Oil Production, Consumption and Export Projections to 2030 
With a combined value of only 4 billion barrels, Canada‟s conventional oil 
deposits can no longer be depended upon to produce significant amounts of oil.  The 
WCSB has already matured and has seen production decline at a rate of 3% per year, 
which is the rate of decline foreseen until 2020 [NEB 2009 Reference Case Scenario].  
The offshore fields in Eastern Canada are also in a state of decline and without 
significant new discoveries it is assumed this trend will also continue.  New discoveries 
are still being made and new project proposals have been submitted, however it is not 
expected that a significant discovery will be made that can reverse the decline.   The 
NEB projects production in the WCSB to decline to a production level of 700,000 b/d 
by 2020 and offshore production to decline to 212,000 b/d over the same time period 
[NEB 2009 Reference Case Scenario].  Further recovery from these fields is expected 
to improve due to Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) technologies; however, the total 
amount of oil that can be extracted using EOR is estimated to total only 100 million 
barrels which is insufficient to alter future production expectations.  As these older 
fields continue to decline, the only source remaining for expanded production is in the 
oil sands.  
 As opposed to conventional sources of oil, the oil sands are a very difficult and 
costly source of crude oil.  In order to receive a 10% rate of return on investment the 
price of oil needs to be in the range of at least $60-$85 per barrel
23
 [CERA Growth in 
the Canadian Oil Sands, 2009].  Investments in oil sands projects are, therefore, subject 
to change according to market price fluctuations and the overall economic situation.  
When the price of oil dropped from above $140 per barrel in July 2008 to $40 per 
barrel by December 2008, many planned investments were delayed.  The result was a 
drop in industry capital spending from $20 billion in 2008 to $10 billion in 2009 
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 West Texas Intermediate (WTI) price 
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[CAPP, 2009].  The drop in capital spending will not impact current production but if 
investments continue to be delayed future oil sands expansion will be in jeopardy.  
According to the most current projections, sufficient investments will be made to 
enable oil sands production to increase up until the year 2030.  Total Canadian oil 
production will increase to over 4 Mb/d by 2015 and approach 5.5 Mb/d by 2030, see 
Figure 43 for three different projections.  The projections in Figure 43 are similar to the 
projections made by the NEB and CAPP.  CAPP projects oil production reaching 4 
Mb/d in 2020 and 4.17 Mb/d in 2025 the NEB projects 2020 production to be 3.8 Mb/d 
[CAPP, 2009 and NEB 2009 Reference Case Scenario].  The numbers calculated by 
CAPP and NEB do not include the production of refined petroleum products which 
would increase their estimates to levels comparable with the OPEC and EIA 
projections.  The fact that so many industry projections show similar future estimates 
provides confidence that oil production of around 5 Mb/d will be attained by 2030.   
Figure 43: Various Projections of Canadian Oil Production to 2030 
 
Sources: EIA International Energy Outlook, 2009, OPEC World Oil Outlook 2009, IEA World Energy Outlook, 2009 
 
In order to assess the likely volume of Canadian oil exports by 2030, projections 
of Canadian oil consumption must first be analyzed.  Growth in Canadian oil 
consumption has historically been much slower than in the United States.  Between 
1980 and 2008 Canadian oil consumption increased from 1.87 Mb/d to 2.26 Mb/d [EIA 
International Energy Statistics], an average annual compound growth rate of 0.67%.  
Growth in Canadian oil consumption between 2008 and 2030 will be even slower; by 
2020 consumption will be 2.3 Mb/d, close to present levels, and rise slightly to 2.4 
Mb/d in 2025 and 2.5 Mb/d in 2030 [EIA International Energy Outlook, 2009].  At 
these projected levels, oil consumption would only grow by an average annual 
compound rate of 0.46%.  The relatively flat rate of growth in future oil consumption 
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implies that the virtually all oil production increases from the oil sands will be 
exported.  Some Western Canadian crude will be sent to refineries in Eastern Canada to 
compensate for loses in production rates from Atlantic Canada, and oil exports to China 
may also increase.  Once the Northern Gateway pipeline connecting the oil sands 
region to ports on the Pacific coast is completed, 525,000 barrels of oil per day will be 
available for overseas shipments [Northern Gateway Pipelines].  Of this total, it is 
expected that approximately 200,000 b/d will make it way to China while the rest can 
be shipped to other Asian markets or to the American West Coast [Guly, 2005].  It can 
therefore be expected that oil exports to the United States can potentially increase by 
nearly 2 Mb/d.  This would translate into total Canadian oil exports to the United States 
reaching 4 Mb/d by 2030.  By 2030 it has been estimated that American oil import 
requirements will be 8.49 Mb/d (see section 3.3.3), meaning Canada will potentially 
supply the United States with slightly less than half of their total required imports of 
oil.  The oil industry is already preparing for this eventuality by planning to increase the 
current pipeline capacity.  As previously mentioned the current pipeline infrastructure 
is reaching its maximum capacity however new pipelines and extensions of existing 
pipelines will begin to add capacity before 2010.  TransCanada‟s Keystone pipeline is 
expected to begin sending oil to the United States in December 2009 with an initial 
capacity of 435,000 barrels per day before eventually reaching 590,000 barrels per day 
by late 2010 [TransCanada, Keystone Pipeline].  Enbridge is also working towards 
completing its Alberta Clipper pipeline which will ship oil to Wisconsin at a rate of 
450,000 barrels per day by mid-2010 and have an ultimate capacity of 800,000 barrels 
per day [Enbridge,
 
Alberta Clipper].  The sum of all current projects already under 
construction will add 2.22 Mb/d of potential pipeline capacity by the end of 2010, far 
ahead of an equal production output from the oil sands. 
The consequence for American oil security from an increase in American oil 
import dependence on Canada is significant: American oil security will be greatly 
improved by relying on Canada.  Canada is one of the most secure oil producing 
countries in the world due to a low level of threat from terrorist attacks on oil 
installations in addition to the fact that almost all oil shipments are done through 
pipelines [DeBard,2009].  Oil shipments by tankers are less secure compared with 
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pipelines because they are subject to threats from piracy, geopolitics and adverse 
weather conditions.  Pirates have targeted oil tankers on several occasions, most 
recently on December 30
th
, 2009 [The New York Times, Dec. 30, 2009].  Although that 
attack, in addition to another pirate attack of the coast of Benin [BBC News, Nov. 24, 
2009], were unsuccessful in capturing the vessel, pirates did manage to hijack a Saudi 
oil tanker in 2008.  The Sirius Star was hijacked off the coast of Somalia carrying 2 
million barrels of Saudi oil, equal to more than a quarter of Saudi Arabian daily oil 
output [BBC News, Nov. 18, 2009].  These attacks prove oil tankers are vulnerable to 
piracy and can seriously disrupt oil exports.  Oil shipments by sea can also be severely 
disrupted by geopolitics in the Strait of Hormuz.  The strait is control by Iran, a country 
with whom many Western nations have very strained relations.  Tankers leaving the 
ports in Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates must cross the Strait 
of Hormuz, through which approximately 40% of the world‟s oil is shipped [DeBard, 
2009].  Should Iran close this strait for any reason, it would cause a severe disruption in 
oil shipments.  Finally, pipelines are not affected by high winds, waves, and storms; 
weather events which can delay, damage, or even wreck, oil tankers.  Furthermore, oil 
trade between Canada and the United States is protected by NAFTA, ensuring that 
Canadian politicians cannot threaten to withhold oil exports to the U.S.  NAFTA 
guarantees that American political leaders will not need to worry about a supply 
disruption for almost half of their total oil imports in 2030, freeing them to concentrate 
on securing oil supply contracts from other nations.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The United States is currently one of the least oil secure countries in the world.  
Despite a constant decline in American domestic oil production since 1970, oil 
consumption has substantially increased over the past 40 years.  As a result, the United 
States has been forced to rely on a growing volume of oil imports to make-up the gap 
between oil production and consumption.  American oil security is negatively affected 
due to several factors, but the fact that the U.S. is the world‟s largest oil importer is the 
most important variable.  In order to satisfy their demand for oil, the United States has 
no option but to rely on imports from countries in economically and politically unstable 
regions, including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and Venezuela.  Most oil producing 
nations are not concerned with American interests and may even try to harm the 
economic well-being of the United States through oil supply disruptions.  American oil 
security is further affected due to the inherent dangers present in relying on oil 
shipments from overseas which can be disrupted due to geopolitics, piracy and weather 
conditions.  It is clear that current American oil consumption and import levels 
continue to place the United States oil security in jeopardy. 
 Looking into the future, however, shows that American oil security will greatly 
improve.  Projections reveal that growth of American oil consumption will remain 
relatively flat over the next 20 years while domestic oil production will receive a boost 
from oil extraction on the Outer Continental Shelf.  These two factors will result in a 
modest decline of oil imports.  The greatest oil security improvements, however, will 
come from increasing American oil supply dependence on Canada.  Canada, one of the 
most secure oil producing countries in the world, is already the largest foreign oil 
supplier to the United States.  Not only does Canada have a stable democracy and good 
foreign relations with the U.S., but they have a direct financial interest in the economic 
prosperity of the United States.  Free trade between the two countries has deepened 
their level of economic integration while provisions included in NAFTA guarantee that 
the United States will receive a stable flow of Canadian crude oil and oil products.  As 
Canadian oil production increases over the next 20 years, so too will their volume of 
exports to the United States.  The larger volume of future oil exports will increase 
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Canada‟s share of total American oil imports from 19% in 2008 to nearly 50% by the 
year 2030.  Canadian oil imports will thus displace a sizeable portion of oil imports 
from more volatile nations.  Additional oil security gains will be realized due to the 
network of oil pipelines which link the neighbouring countries.  Pipelines, unlike oil 
tankers, are not subject to disruptions from geopolitics, piracy, or adverse weather 
conditions.  Several challenges must still be overcome, however.  Development of the 
oil sands will require high levels of financial investment in order to increase capacity 
while the environmental impact from refining the oil sands must also be addressed by 
the Canadian government.  The significant influence of oil on the American and 
Canadian economies, however, ensures that the two countries will work together to 
overcome any of these challenges.  This spirit of cooperation will be financially 
advantageous for Canada, and will vastly improve American oil security. 
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ANNEX 1: 
 
BTC Pipeline Route 
 
Source: BBC News Sept. 17, 2002 
Nabucco Pipeline route 
 
Source: Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project 
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ANNEX 2 
Calculation of Hubbert’s Curve: 
Hubbert‟s Curve begins with two considerations; 
a) With a finite resource the production rate at time t=0 and t=  is equal to zero. 
b) If there exists a single-valued function , then 
 
   (1) 
where A is equal to the area between the curve  and the x-axis from 
the origin to the point . 
If the production curve is plotted against time then we have 
   (2) 
where dt is the quantity of the resource produced at time dt.  
From equation (1) we see that the area under the curve to any point of time t is 
 (3) 
Where  is the cumulative production up to time t.  Ultimate production will be 
given by  
 
And will be represented on the graph of production versus time as the total area 
beneath the curve. 
 
Source: Hubbert, 1956 
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Examples of bell-shaped curves in a mature oil regions: 
Oil production in the United States (1935-200)    Oil Production in Europe (1970-2006) 
         
Source: Energy Watch Group, Crude Oil the Supply Outlook, 2007 
 
Top 20 Giant Oil Fields in the World 
 
Source: Robelius, 2007 
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ANNEX 3: 
 
Sources of U.S. Oil Imports by Country (thousands of barrels per year) 
 
Source: EIA Petroleum Navigator 
ANNEX 4: 
Unprocessed oil sand 
 
Source: http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/files/images/oilsand.jpg 
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Canadian Oil Exports to the United States by PADD 
 
Source: CAPP, 2009 
 
Oil Sands Open-pit Mining Process 
 
Source: CERA Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands, 2009 
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Steam Assisted Gravity Drainage (SAGD) extraction 
 
Source: CERA Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands, 2009 
 
Cyclic Steam Stimulation (CSS) extraction 
 
Source: http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=AFF9B551-1&toc=show&offset=8 
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Well-to-retail pump GHG emissions by source 
 
Source: CERA Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands, 2009 
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